DePaul Business and Commercial
Law Journal
Volume 5
Issue 1 Fall 2006

Article 5

Mere Refinement of the State Action Doctrine Will Not Work
Peter Hettich

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/bclj

Recommended Citation
Peter Hettich, Mere Refinement of the State Action Doctrine Will Not Work, 5 DePaul Bus. & Com. L.J. 105
(2006)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/bclj/vol5/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Business and Commercial Law Journal by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae.
For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

Mere Refinement of the State Action Doctrine Will Not Work
Peter Hettich*

ABSTRACT

By proclaimingthe State Action Doctrine,the Supreme Court aims to
preserve the states' rights to enact economic regulation which conflict
with the federal antitrust laws. The doctrine exempts regulated private
partiesfrom antitrustenforcement when they are insulated by the State.
Without granting the exemption, private parties would have to decide
between obeying anticompetitive state regulation and complying with
federal antitrustlaws, riskingpunishment either way. The doctrine provides a test to determine whether to grant the immunity. Farfrom being
settled, the test is battled heavily all the way up to the Supreme Court.
In Ticor, Justice Scalia expressed skepticism whether an "exemption for
state-programmed private collusion" is justified at all. Other Justices
have been more favorable towards state and local regulation of commerce. Beside this more philosophical clash about the proper scope of
regulation, it is generally acknowledged that the doctrine bears inherent
flaws and provides little guidance. Justice O'Connor has already
pointed out that it is unfair to punish regulatedparties with treble damages for their compliance with anticompetitive state regulation.
The State Action Task Force of the FTC acknowledges the inherent
flaws of the State Action Doctrine, as do most scholars. However, all
proposals made so far aim to clarify and refine the State Action Doctrine. The current proposals have their merits, but they will only mitigate the problems associated with the State Action Doctrine. The
present standardrequires a "clearly articulatedstate policy" and "active
supervision" for immunity; these are purely procedural requirements.
In this essay, I propose to include institutionaland substantive changes
to the State Action Doctrine. From an institutional perspective, the
courts should reaffirm the FTC's mandate to preserve public policy; the
FTC is best suited to defend the federal interest in unfettered competi* Lecturer for economic constitutional law and regulation at the University St. Gallen (Switzerland); LL.M. (Columbia Law School); Doctor Juris (University St. Gallen); Attorney at Law
in Zurich (Switzerland). The author thanks the Swiss National Science Foundation, the JanggenPoehn Foundation, and VISCHER Attorneys at law for their generous financial contributions to
his research.
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tion. From a substantivepoint of view, the courts have to reengage in a
moderate review of the reasonablenessof state regulation. I do not ask
for a revival of the Lochner era; however, the competitive process needs
at least minimal protection against arbitrarystate regulation.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The first sentence of Judge Easterbrook's article on antitrust and
the economics of federalism reads: "There is an uneasy coexistence
between federal antitrust laws and state regulatory regimes." 1 This
sentence boldly understates the impact of economic regulation. There
is no coexistence because economic regulation eliminates the elements of competition which that regulation addresses (e.g., price,
quantity, market entry). In regulated markets, the remaining elements of competition after regulation may be so negligible that the
positive effects of competition - low prices, innovation, etc. - are no
longer triggered. Adopting this perspective, regulation and competition are mutually exclusive; and must prevail over the other. This is
the purpose of the State Action Doctrine.
From an economist's perspective, regulation is only justified in the
case of market failure: in other words if competition does not work.
Thus, the incompatibility of regulation and competition is not a problem where regulation is used to cure inevitable breakdowns of (all or
part) of the ordinary competitive process. In such cases, regulation
only modifies the outcome (equilibrium) of a failed market (e.g., mitigating problems in connection with public goods, information asymmetry, transaction costs, and externalities). The equilibrium in a
regulated market may try to simulate an outcome that would be
achieved in a competitive process, but a regulated market can never
match the unpredictable patterns of true competition. Where no
workable competition exists and market failures are addressed by
state regulation, additional intervention with antitrust laws may be
counterproductive and may even topple the state's regulatory framework. However, the states' regulatory and intervention programs
2
have crossed the line of "market failure justification" a long time ago.
Ever since the era of Lochner v. New York expired the federal, state,
and local governments have had broad discretion whether and how to
1. Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 Journal of Law and
Economics 23, 23 (1983).
2. E.g., by promoting the production of merit goods like universal postal service (39 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2006) and 39 U.S.C § 403 (2006)), by requiring telecommunication providers to ask only
for just and reasonable charges (47 U.S.C. § 201 (2006)), or by reserving cable channels for
public, educational, or governmental use (47 U.S.C. § 531 (2006)).
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interfere with the freedom to contract, and whether and how to regu3
late private markets for public interest, even absent market failures.
In working markets, regulated parameters replace the equilibrium
which would be achieved by competition; e.g., the regulated price replaces the competitive price. In such markets (markets regulated by
the states but not affected by market failures), application of federal
antitrust laws may limit overreaching and harmful state regulation.
We live in a federation with strong antitrust laws intended to secure
vibrant commerce between the states. However, we recognize that
the states in this federation may also have a legitimate interest in regulating commerce in various ways. Thus, it must be decided which
interest - the interest of the federation or the interest of the states should prevail in case of a conflict. 4 The standard to resolve this conflict is the State Action Doctrine, which was formed by the federal
courts over a long history of cases. However, the created standard
still leaves many questions unresolved, which will be discussed in section II. Section III takes a brief look at the consequences of applying
the standard; there are quite important drawbacks connected with the
existing standard, which are not resolved merely by addressing the
concerns raised in Section II. Instead of attempting to refine the existing standard, in Section IV(A), I will entertain a combination of
possible improvements. These improvements, which are described in
Sections IV(B)-IV(D) will modify the existing standard in its substance and provide additional procedural safeguards, thereby resolving most of the existing concerns.
I will not discuss the Congress-created exemption in the McCarranFerguson Act 5 , which provides that state law may take precedence
over federal antitrust laws; this specific exemption is only for one industry and differs in its nature and scope from the general exemption
provided by the judiciary's State Action Doctrine. 6 Also, I will refrain
3. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) ("So far as the requirement of due process is
concerned, and in the absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose"). See also West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish. 300 U.S.
379, 399-400 (1937).
4. The construction and legal history of the federal antitrust laws, which hint that those laws
should primarily regulate the behavior of private parties, makes it impossible to find the prevailing standard by pointing at the Supremacy Clause, M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819),
and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); see also infra Part II(A).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006) and 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (2006).
6. It seems an impossible task for Congress to try to compile a list determining the relationship between the Sherman Act and any possible kind of state regulation. For exemptions created by Congress see Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: Vol. 1. 321-355
(2nd ed. 2000).
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from discussing conflicts between federal regulation and federal antitrust laws here: the relationship between federal regulation and federal antitrust laws is determined by considerations other than
federalism. In his article, Paul Posner pointed out that "Congress
clearly has authority to modify the impact of the antitrust laws so that
the accommodation between antitrust and regulation may be a matter
7
of interpretation of federal regulatory statutes."

II.

STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

The State Action Doctrine draws a line between the states' ability
to regulate their commerce and the federal policy of unfettered competition. The doctrine allows uncovering, as some commentators
point out, the "implied exemptions" of the federal antitrust laws.8
Unlike challenges under the Dormant Commerce Clause and, earlier,
Substantive Due Process, when a state action immunity is denied it
does not result in an invalidation of the state regulation. 9 Without
state action immunity, however, regulated actors who 10comply with
state regulation are subject to federal antitrust scrutiny.
Under the State.Action Doctrine, courts have developed a tiered
test to determine whether to grant state action immunity from federal
antitrust enforcement: basically, a state's regulatory framework has to
emanate from a clearly articulated state policy and has to be adequately supervised. Although the basic framework of the test seems
simple, the federal courts have struggled with its application in different factual circumstances. This section shows that the test is not applied in a consistent, uniform manner by neither the lower courts nor
by the United States Supreme Court.
After describing the basic framework of the State Action Doctrine,
I examine in detail, in sub-section A, which actors are held to be sovereign actors by the federal courts. In sub-section B I explain that
7. Paul S. Posner, The ProperRelationship between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust
Laws, 49 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 693, 697 (1974). See also City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (arguing that Congress sought to establish a regime of competition as
the fundamental principle governing commerce by enacting the Sherman Act). "For this reason,
our cases have held that even when Congress by subsequent legislation establishes a regulatory
regime over an area of commercial activity, the antitrust laws will not be displaced unless it
appears that the antitrust and regulatory provisions are plainly repugnant. The presumption
against repeal by implication reflects the understanding that the antitrust laws establish overarching and fundamental policies, a principle which argues with equal force against implied exclusions." Id. at 398-99 (internal citations omitted).
8. Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 301.
9. Jim Rossi, Political Bargainingand Judicial Intervention in Constitutionaland Antitrust Federalism, 83 Wash. U. L. Q. 521, 546 (2005).
10. Id.
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regulatory frameworks enacted by a sovereign actor are not subject to
the State Action Doctrine. Sub-section C continues to examine the
framework by defining "clearly articulated state policy". Finally, subsection D examines and defines the role of "active supervision" within
this framework.
A.

Basic Framework: Parker and Midcal

The United States Supreme Court developed the State Action Doctrine in 1943 when it decided Parkerv. Brown.a l There, the court had
to decide the validity of California's prorate program, a state enacted
marketing program for raisins, under the Sherman Act t2 and the
Commerce Clause.1 3 The prorate program decreased the amount of
available raisins in the market by creating "pools" of raisins not available for general distribution. This reduced competition among producers, stabilized prices, and mainly affected interstate and foreign
14
commerce in raisins.
While noting that the prorate program may have been illegal under
the Sherman Act 15 and that Congress may probably choose to prohibit such a program, the Court held that the program derived its authority from the command of a sovereign state's legislature.16
Substantial participation by producers in establishing the program was
not of relevance to the Court.1 7 The Sherman Act, according to the
Court, gave "no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or
official action directed by a state" as it was present in the prorate program. 18 Also, the substantial effect of the program on interstate and
foreign commerce did not render the program invalid under the Commerce Clause; in the Court's opinion, the program addressed a prob11. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
12. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14. Parker, 317 U.S. at 345-48. The program created an "inferior raisins pool", a "surplus
pool" and a "stabilization pool" in order to reduce pressure on prices. Between ninety and
ninety-five percent of all Californian raisins are ultimately shipped in interstate or foreign commerce; almost all raisins consumed in the U.S. and nearly half of the world crop originate from
California. Id. at 345.
15. Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) (finding it per se
illegal for oil companies to eliminate "distress" gasoline as a market factor of spot market prices
for gasoline by purchasing the excess production of independent refiners).
16. Parker,317 U.S. at 350-51.
17. Id. at 352. Although later in Midcal, the court emphasized the importance of the commission's oversight for the decision to grant immunity in Parker. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 104 (1980).
18. Parker,317 U.S. at 351. However, the court added that a state may not grant immunity to
persons violating the Sherman Act by authorizing violations or by declaring such violations lawful. Id.
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lem of local character, was non-discriminatory, was appropriate to the
end sought, and outweighed any national interest in the free flow of
commerce. 19
In the aftermath of Parker, courts further clarified the necessary
amount of state involvement in economic restraints to trigger application of the State Action Doctrine. 20 However, in these later cases,
courts seemed to be less inclined to grant regulators the same leeway
the Court granted in Parker.While Parker seemed to welcome state
regulation, deemed to fight the evils of competition, 21 subsequent
cases adopted a more cautious approach and emphasized the beneficial effects of state regulation on social welfare, particularly regarding
22
the regulation's ability to promote, e.g., lower prices or innovation.
In CaliforniaRetail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.
the United States Supreme Court articulated the modern form of the
State Action Doctrine, as it is applied today. 23 The Midcal case dealt
with a California statute requiring producers and wholesalers to file
fair trade contracts or price schedules with the State (i.e. to use vertical price fixing or resale price maintenance).24 Midcal was charged
with selling wine for less than the prices set by the applicable price
schedules, and also for selling wines for which no fair trade contract or
schedule had been filed. 25 In this case, the state exercised no control
over wine prices, nor did it review the filed prices. 26 The corporation
asked for an injunction against the State's wine-pricing scheme.
Midcal developed "two standards for antitrust immunity under
Parker v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy'; second, the
policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself. ' 27 The Court
then held that California's wine pricing scheme satisfied the first standard of clear articulation because the "legislative policy was forthrightly stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price
19. Id. at 359-68. In comparing the relative weights of the conflicting local and national interests involved, it was significant for the court that Congress already had enacted similar programs.
Id. at 367. But see Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 386 (1951) (holding that the extension of vertical price-fixing arrangements on non-signers, as authorized by Louisiana law, violates the Sherman Act, absent approval by Congress). This seems to be a different
line of argument, if compared to Parker.
20. See infra, II.B.-D.
21. Evils as there are, e.g., the "ruinous competition" between producers of raisins.
22. See Frank H. Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 27.
23. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
24. Id. at 99.
25. Id. at 100.
26. Id. at 97-99.
27. Id. at 105.
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maintenance. ' 28 However, the State failed the second prong as it did
not supervise its pricing scheme:
The State simply authorizes price setting and enforces the prices

established by private parties. The State neither establishes prices
nor reviews the reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it
regulate the terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not monitor market conditions or engage in any "pointed reexamination" of
the program. The national policy in favor of competition cannot be
thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement
over
29
what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.
After weighing the wide latitude of the states' power to regulate
commerce in liquor against the federal interest in enforcing a national
policy in favor of competition, the Court found the state's interest less
substantial. 30 The California resale price maintenance scheme neither
reduced the consumption of liquor, nor sustained small retail establishments. 31 By weighing the state's interest against the federal interest, the Court thus rooted the State Action Doctrine in Federalism,
similar to Parker.
B.

State Sovereignty

1. State of the Law
Thus, in Parkerand Midcal, the United States Supreme Court based
the State Action Doctrine on federalism. 32 Actions emanating from a
sovereign state, i.e. actions, which can be attributed directly to the
state, are exempted from the application of the antitrust laws.33 A
number of other cases further clarified the immunity of private actors
from Sherman Act scrutiny when obeying anticompetitive regulation
enacted by a sovereign entity.
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the United States Supreme Court
had to decide whether the Supreme Court of Arizona enjoys antitrust
immunity when imposing and enforcing a disciplinary rule that restricts advertising by attorneys. 34 Appellants John R. Bates and Van
28. Id.
29. Id. at 105-06.
30. Id. at 113.
31. Id. at 112-13. This finding was supported by evidence in Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 457-58 (1978).
32. "In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed
purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress." Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
33. Id. at 350-51.
34. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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O'Steen advertised their fee schedule in violation of this rule. 35 The
Court held that the Arizona Constitution vested its Supreme Court
with the power over the practice of law, and that the Arizona Supreme Court's restraint on advertising was therefore compelled by the
state acting as a sovereign. 36 The state's Supreme Court, when acting
in a legislative capacity, occupied the same position as that of a state
legislature. 37 The Court deemed it "significant that the state policy is
so clearly and affirmatively expressed and that the State's supervision
3
is so active."
The holding in Bates, regarding the sovereignty of states' Supreme
Courts, was confirmed in Hoover v. Ronwin.3 9 In this case, the
United States Supreme Court dealt with an unsuccessful candidate for
admission to the Bar of Arizona. 40 The candidate Edward Ronwin asserted that the members of the Arizona Supreme Court's Committee
on Examinations and Admissions conspired to reduce the number of
competing attorneys. 41 The Court held that the Supreme Court of Arizona, by delegating only the bar examination, retained its sovereign
42
power to determine who should be admitted to the Arizona bar.
The action, whether anticompetitive or not, was that of the Arizona
Supreme Court and, therefore, non-delegated and immune from antitrust scrutiny. 43 The Hoover decision made clear that the Court was
not going to examine actions of a sovereign entity, irrespective of its
impact on competition - the judiciary showed willingness to intervene
44
only in cases of delegated authority.
In contrast to state Supreme Courts, local governments are not
deemed to be sovereign. In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co.,45 the United States Supreme Court dealt with the question
of whether cities owning and operating electric utility systems may be
reached under the Sherman Act. 46 The City of Lafayette allegedly
35. Id. at 354-55.
36. Id. at 360-63.
37. Id. at 360.
38. Id. at 362 (underscoring further that, in contrast to Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S.
579 (1976), the regulation of the activities of the bar is at the core of the State's power to protect
the public). Nevertheless, the ban on advertising was held unconstitutional on First Amendment
grounds. Id. at 384.
39. 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
40. Id.
41. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 565 (1984).
42. Id. at 572.
43. Id. at 573-74.
44. See also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-51 (1943).
45. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
46. Id. at 391.
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conducted sham litigation in order to delay the construction of a nuclear power plant of a competitor, prevented competition within the
city's boundaries through anticompetitive covenants, conspired with
other parties to extend the provision of power to certain service areas
beyond the time periods allowed by state law, and required customers
outside its city limits to purchase electricity from the city in order to
obtain gas and water. 47 The Court rejected the argument that public
services of a municipality should be exempted just because the welfare
of its citizens is assured by the political process, pointing to vulnerable
consumers outside the community. 4 8 Moreover, the court did not
question the ability of a community to take action against municipal
49
enterprises.
The Court argued further that there are too many local govern50
ments which may affect the competitive process in a distorting way.
Lacking sovereignty, municipalities should not be automatically afforded antitrust immunity. 51 Although Parker immunity for municipalities is not as readily established as it is for states, the Lafayette
Court made clear that adequate state mandate, authorization, or direction may shield municipalities from the antitrust laws. 52 By requiring "adequate" authorization, the Court emphasized that a specific,
detailed legislative command is not necessary for the municipality to
assert immunity. 5 3 Chief Justice Burger, concurring, underscored the
"difference between a State's entrepreneurial personality and a sover47. 532 F.2d 431, at 432-33 (5th Cir. 1976).
48. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 406-07. "The argument that consumers dissatisfied with the
service provided by the municipal utilities may seek redress through the political process is without merit. While petitioners recognize, as they must, that those consumers living outside the
municipality who are forced to take municipal service have no political recourse at the municipal
level, they argue nevertheless that the customers may take their complaints to the state legislature. It fairly may be questioned whether the consumers in question or the Florida corporation
of which LP&L is a subsidiary have a meaningful chance of influencing the state legislature to
outlaw on an ad hoc basis whatever anticompetitive practices petitioners may direct against them
from time to time. More fundamentally, however, that argument cuts far too broadly; the same
argument may be made regarding anticompetitive activity in which any corporation engages.
Mulcted consumers and unfairly displaced competitors may always seek redress through the
political process. In enacting the Sherman Act, however, Congress mandated competition as the
polestar by which all must be guided in ordering their business affairs. It did not leave this
fundamental national policy to the vagaries of the political process, but established a broad policy, to be administered by neutral courts, which would guarantee every enterprise the right to
exercise 'whatever economic muscle it can muster,' without regard to the amount of influence it
might have with local or state legislatures." Id. (internal citation omitted).
49. In light of public choice theory, this hypothesis may be questioned. See infra, Part III(E).
50. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 407-08.
51. Id. at 412.
52. Id. at 414-15.
53. Id. at 415 (holding that it is enough to show that the state legislature contemplated the
kind of action complained of).
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eign's decision . . . to replace competition with regulation"; 54 entrepreneurial, proprietary activity is not an attribute of sovereignty
asking for protection under a federalist system. 55 In the aftermath of
this case, the Court would also need to inquire whether "the implied
exemption from federal law was necessary in order to make the regulatory Act work, and even then only [grant the exemption] to the minimum extent necessary. ' 56 The dissenters, on the other hand, wanted
the distinction between private and governmental action to control
57
this case.
The United States Supreme Court used Town of Hallie v. City of
Eau Claire58 to elaborate further on the exemption of local governments. There, a Wisconsin statute authorized cities to construct, add
to, alter, and repair sewage systems, and to describe with reasonable
particularity the district to be served. 59 Adjacent townships alleged a
Sherman Act violation, claiming that the City of Eau Claire violated
the Sherman Act by acquiring a monopoly over the provision of sewage treatment services in the area and by tying the provision of these
services to the provision of sewage collection and transportation services. 60 According to the Supreme Court, anticompetitive "conduct
was a foreseeable result of empowering the City to refuse to serve
unannexed areas"; 61 the Wisconsin statutes "evidenced a 'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed' state policy to displace competition with regulation in the area of municipal provision of sewage
services."' 62 Compulsion by the state was not a prerequisite to finding
63
a municipality acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state action.
Another case, Fisher v. City of Berkeley, excluded most ordinary legislative activity of a municipality from the reach of the Antitrust Laws,
and extended the State Action Doctrine in a significant way. 64 In this
case, the United States Supreme Court confirmed that "[o]nly where
legislation is found to conflict 'irreconcilably' with the antitrust laws,
54. Id. at 422.
55. Chief Justice Burger's distinction between proprietary and sovereign activity raises the
question of a possible market participant exception, as will be discussed infra, IV(C).
56. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 426 (internal citation omitted).
57. Id. at 434. See infra Part IV.C. regarding an exception for entrepreneurial governmental
activities (market participant exception).
58. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
59. Id. at 41 (internal quotations and brackets omitted).
60. Id. at 36-37.
61. Id. at 42.
62. Id. at 44.
63. See Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 44.
64. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, Cal., 475 U.S. 260, 265 (1986).
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the question of state action immunity arises. ' 65 The Fisher case dealt
with a municipal rent stabilization ordinance that imposed ceilings on
rent increases. 66 According to the Court, the ordinance was unilaterally imposed and lacked an element of concerted action necessary to
violate the Sherman Act. 67 Therefore, only hybrid restraints, which
grant private actors some degree of regulatory power, could be at68
tacked under the Antitrust Laws.
Justice Brennan, dissenting, pointed out that the ordinance effectively fixed prices for rental units in the city of Berkeley: "[the] vertical control destroys horizontal competition as effectively as if [the]
landlords [had] formed a combination and endeavored to establish the
same restrictions . . . by agreement with each other. ' 69 The coercive
character of the law, according to Brennan, was no reason to dismiss a
70
meeting of minds or to limit antirust liability.
In cases following Fisher, municipally owned entities whose directors are municipal officers and which perform traditional local government functions such as waste disposal have been treated like
municipalities for antitrust purposes, thereby extending the scope of
71
immunity for municipal actors.
The United States Supreme Court reserved the question of whether
an action of a state's executive branch is that of the state for a later
time. 72 The circuit courts seem to have accepted this invitation to rule
in a permissive way.
The First Circuit, in deciding whether the Department of Health
can confer a monopoly to a university in the screening of newborn
babies, held that the Department's regulation is per se protected by
73
the State Action Doctrine.
65. 475 U.S. 260, 265 (1986); see also Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982)
(recognizing that the function of government may often be to tamper with free markets, correcting their failures and aiding their victims, the Court noted that "[a] state statute is not preempted by the federal antitrust laws simply because the state scheme might have an
anticompetitive effect").
66. Fisher, 475 U.S. at 261-62.
67. Id. at 266-67.
68. Id. at 267-68.
69. Id. at 276 (citing Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911)
(internal quotation and citation omitted)).
70. Id. at 277.
71. Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 998 F.2d 1073, 1077-78 (1st Cir. 1993) (treating waste management company as a municipality).
72. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. at 558, 568 n.17 (1984).
73. Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England Newborn Screening Program, 187 F.3d 24, 28-29
(1st Cir. 1999).
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Two important cases of the Second Circuit dealt with the question

whether modern forms of government, like governmental corporations, may be held sovereign and automatically immune from antitrust
liability. In Automated Salvage Transport, Inc. v. WheelabratorEnvironmental Systems, Inc., the Second Circuit concluded that the Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority is a political subdivision of the
state. 74 The court even considered whether the authority should be
treated as the state itself, because the entity was created by the Connecticut General Assembly and lacked absolute operational autonomy. 7 5 However, in the earlier case of Cine 42nd Street Theater Corp.
v. Nederlander Organization,Inc. 76 , the Second Circuit decided that
New York's Urban Development Corporation could not claim state

immunity for itself.77 The entity was created as a corporate govern78
mental agency of the state; in other words a political subdivision. It
was structured to operate independently, free from the political and

bureaucratic inertia; thus, lacking sufficient state involvement, the en79
tity could not be acting in a sovereign capacity.
The Ninth Circuit readily extended Parker immunity to state executives and executive agencies.80 The Fifth Circuit held that a University
Interscholastic League, a division of a state university, is exempted
from the Sherman Act. 81 The Third Circuit held in two cases that
private participants in state action cases enjoy Parker immunity only

to the extent the states enjoy immunity.8 2

74. Automated Salvage Transp., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Envtl. Sys., 155 F.3d 59, 71 (2d Cir.
1998).
75. Id. (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 61 (1994) (O'Connor,
dissenting, underscored the importance of accountability to the state and, by extension, to the
electorate, i.e. supervision of the elected government, for immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment)).
76. 790 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1986).
77. 790 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1986).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Haw, Inc., 810 F.2d 869, 875-76 (9th Cir.
1987) (department of transportation); Deak-Perera Haw., Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 745 F.2d 1281,
1282-83 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1053 (1985).
81. Saenz v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 487 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973). See also Brentwood
Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, No. 3:97-1249, 2002 WL 32333036, at *1 (M.D.
Tenn. Oct. 25, 2002) (holding that Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association is a state
actor).
82. Mariana v. Fisher, 338 F.3d 189, 203 (3d Cir. 2003); A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co., v. Philip
Morris Inc.. 263 F.3d 239, 266 (3d Cir. 2001). Both cases dealing with the Multistate Settlement
Agreement between the States and the Cigarette Industry, the Bedell court held that sufficient
state involvement was shown by the concerted action of state legislatures, state courts, and state
attorneys to implement the agreement. A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co., 263 F.3d. at 260.
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The Circuit Courts have continuously expanded the scope of sover83
eign state actors. Still, regulators like public service commissions,
state bars, 84 or state regulatory boards, 85 are, with little exception,
held not to be sovereign. Special tax districts like the Halifax Hospital
Medical Center are not sovereign, either. 86 Acting alone, these instruments of government could not immunize private anticompetitive
87
conduct.
2.

Gaps in Defining Sovereign Actors

The federal courts have been successful in identifying the core sovereign state actors, i.e. state legislatures and state supreme courts.
Also, it seems clear that private participation in boards, councils, and
the like, generally precludes status as a state agency, since the private
members have their own agenda which may or may not be responsive
to state policy. 8 8 However, case law does not provide clear guidance
with regard to the question of which subdivisions of the state should
be regarded as sovereign state actors. This is particularly true for state
agencies. As Floyd points out in a thorough analysis of the topic,
"[s]ome courts have concluded that state agencies, like state legislatures, themselves may articulate anticompetitive state policy that is
ipso facto immune from federal antitrust scrutiny." 8 9 Other courts
have followed the suggestion in Town of Hallie90 , and have treated
state agencies like municipalities, exempting them only from the supervision requirement. Therefore, it is not settled whether political
83. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co, 428 U.S. 579, 579; Interface Group, Inc. v. Mass. Port Auth.,
816 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987).
84. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975); Hass v. Or. State Bar, 883 F.2d 1453,
1456 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that state bar selling malpractice insurance was not acting in a
sovereign capacity).
85. Compare Earles v. La. Bd. of Certified Public Accountants, 139 F.3d 1033, 1041-44 (5th
Cir. 1998) (arguing further that the regulatory board is functionally similar to a municipality and
exempted from the active supervision requirement). Compare also FTC v. Monahan, 832 F.2d
688, 689 (1st Cir. 1987) (enforcing subpoenas against the Massachusetts Board of Registration in
Pharmacy). But see Green v. State Bar of Tex., 27 F.3d 1083, 1087 (5th Cir. 1994) (granting state
immunity to a law committee).
86. Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 824 (11th Cir. 1990).
87. But see S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. U.S., 471 U.S. 48, 62-63 (1985) (granting immunity to a public service commission).
88. Wash. State Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Forrest, 930 F.2d 736, 737 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing an apprenticeship council's responsiveness for state labor policy).
89. Douglas C. Floyd, Plain Ambiguities in the ClearArticulation Requirementfor State Action
Antitrust Immunity: The Case of State Agencies, 41 B. C. L. Rev. 1059, 1064 (2000). The author
favors a treatment in between local governments and state legislatures. Id. at 1136. See, e.g., Neo
Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England Newborn Screening Program, 187 F.3d 24, 28-29 (1st Cir.
1999). See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
90. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 n.10 (1985).

118

DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:105

subdivisions of the state are subject to the supervision requirement of
the Midcal test. As the previously described cases point out, there
exist similar problems with municipal entities, and circuit courts struggle with the question of how much supervision should be required for
these.
C.

Conformity with a "Clearly Articulated" State Policy
1. State of the Law

In many cases, the U.S. Supreme Court as well as some district
courts focused on whether the state policy was articulated clearly
enough to grant immunity from antitrust enforcement. As the following section shows, the courts have softened this prong of the State
Action Doctrine over the years; in particular they do not require state
actors to announce expressly their intent to displace competition.
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, the allegedly anticompetitive conduct of the state bar was not based on a clearly articulated policy. 91 In
this case, the U.S. Supreme Court dealt with a minimum fee schedule
of a state bar. 92 The fee schedule was mandatory, enforced by disciplinary sanctions of the bar, and had a significant effect on interstate
commerce. 93 Neither the state legislature nor the Virginia Supreme
Court, which would have the power to regulate attorneys, had compelled the anticompetitive behavior in question. 94 The conduct of the
state bar was, therefore, not the result of a clearly articulated state
95
policy.
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.9 6 , the U.S. Supreme Court rejected
the argument that a state's intent to displace competition could be
derived from a "neutral" regulatory scheme. In this case, a retail
druggist selling light bulbs sued an electric utility, which was distributing light bulbs to residential customers "free" of charge. 97 This so
called "lamp exchange program" formed part of respondent's filed
rate schedule, which was approved by the Michigan Public Service
Commission. 98 There was no statute authorizing regulation of the
light bulb business, nor had the legislature or the Commission, ever
91. 421 U.S. 773, 775 (1975).
92. Id. at 773.
93. Id. at 783-85.
94. Id. at 790-91 (arguing that, "although the Supreme Court's ethical codes mention advisory
fee schedules they do not direct either respondent to supply them, or require the type of price
floor which arose from respondents' activities").
95. Id. at 790.
96. 428 U.S. 579, 581 (1976).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 583.
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made any specific investigation of the desirability of the "lamp exchange program" or of its possible effect on competition in the lightbulb market. 99 The utility was the only utility applying such a
program. 100
Based on these facts, the court inferred that the state law was neutral towards the "lamp exchange program". 10 1 The electricity regulation of the state posed no necessary conflict with the federal antitrust
standard, and the mere possibility of such conflict was insufficient to
grant antitrust immunity.' 0 2 The court further reasoned that regulation could not give rise to an implied exemption if that exemption was
not necessary in order to make the regulatory Act work, and even
then the exemption may be granted only to the minimum extent necessary. 10 3 The court concluded that the light-bulb-exchange program
was not necessary to make electricity regulation work, and that the
State's interest in regulating its utilities' distribution of electricity will
04
be almost entirely unimpaired.
Further, the Court applied Bates, but distinguished it on the facts.
In Bates, the challenged restraint was the affirmative command of the
Arizona Supreme Court. Being the ultimate body wielding the State's
power over the practice of law, the State acting as a sovereign directed
this restraint. 10 5 In Cantor, however, the judges argued that the complaint was directed against a private party. 10 6 Further, the court
claimed that "regulation of the activities of the bar is at the core of the
State's power to protect the public", in contrast to Cantor's light bulb
exchange program only dealing with the scope of additional services
of an utility. 07 Regulating lawyers was deemed in the state's interest
since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of
administering justice, and have historically been officers of the courts,
whereas distributing light bulbs was not such a governmental
function.10 8
In Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States,
several private rate bureaus (composed of motor common carriers)
submitted joint rate proposals to the Public Service Commission in
99. ld. at 584.
100. Id. at 584.
101. Id. at 585
102. Id. at 596.
103. Id. at 597.
104. Id. at 598.
105. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977).
106. Id. at 361.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 361-62.
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four southeastern States. 10 9 The collective ratemaking was authorized, but not compelled, by the respective States in which the rate
bureaus operated. 110 The rates became effective if the service commissions took no action, or, if a hearing was scheduled after their approval.11 1 The motor carriers remained free to submit individual rate
12
proposals.
The Supreme Court thus had to deal with the question of whether a
state can articulate a clear and express policy, even in the absence of
compulsion. 1 13 The court answered the question in the positive, reasoning that motor carriers were still able to submit individual rate pro1 14
posals if they did not want to participate in the joint rate making.
Further, a compulsion-requirement would reduce the range of regulatory alternatives available to the state and could even result in greater
restraints on trade. 115 However, compulsion could still be an indicator
of a clearly articulated state policy. 1 16 The Court further applied a

broad interpretation of the statute in question. Although the Mississippi statute did not specifically address collective ratemaking, the
court was satisfied with the expressed clear intent of the legislature to
determine intrastate motor carrier rates by regulation and not by the
market; a detailed, specific legislative authorization was thus not
required.117
In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder1 8, the extensive powers of self-government in local and municipal matters granted
by a "home rule1 19" were held not to be sufficient for antitrust immunity. The City of Boulder enacted an ordinance preventing petitioner's expansion of business within city limits in order to gain time
120
to draft a more elaborate ordinance dealing with cable television.
109. 471 U.S. 48, 50 (1985).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 50-51.
112. Id. at 50-52.
113. Id. at 55.
114. Id. at 62-65.
115. Id.
116. S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 471 U.S. at 58-62.
117. Id. at 62-66 (explaining that the government conceded that the active supervision requirement was met in this case). See also Sandy River Nursing Care v. Aetna Cas., 985 F.2d 1138,
1146-47 (1st Cir. 1993) (upholding collective ratemaking prompted by state legislature and supervised by the Maine Superintendent of Insurance).
118. Id. at 56.
119. Under the home rule of the constitution of the State of Colorado, a city is entitled to
exercise the full right of self-government in both local and municipal matters, and with respect to
such matters the City Charter and ordinances supersede the laws of the State. Cmty. Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 43-44 (1982).
120. Id. at 44.
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The Supreme Court relied on and affirmed its opinion in City of Lafayette that municipalities are not sovereign and thus not per se exempted from the antitrust laws. 121 The court rejected the city's
argument that regulation of cable television was encompassed within
the home rule power granted by the state constitution. 22 The anticompetitive ordinance in question was, therefore, not backed by a
1 23
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy.
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, pointed out that the court's ruling
would destroy a municipality's power to regulate its economy, "unless
the municipality could point to an affirmatively expressed state policy
1 24
to displace competition in the given area sought to be regulated."'
Fearing Lochner era scrutiny, Rehnquist underscored that the "Sherman Act should not be deemed to authorize federal courts to 'substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative
1 25
bodies, who are elected to pass laws'."'
The insufficiency of home rule powers to suppress competition was
acknowledged in a number of future cases 126 despite the Supreme
Court's most recent and more permissive ruling regarding the articulation requirement in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising,
Inc. 127 In this case, the city council passed an ordinance restricting the
size, location, and spacing of billboards. l2 8 These restrictions, particularly those on spacing, benefited the incumbent Columbia Outdoor
Advertising, Inc., which already had its billboards in place.12 9 The
regulation severely hindered Omni's ability to compete. 130 The applicable state statutes authorized municipalities to regulate and restrict
the height, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures
"for the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or the general
welfare of the community."'13'
121. Id. at 50-51.
122. Id. at 56.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 67.
125. Cmty. Communications Co., 455 U.S. at 67.
126. Hertz Corp. v. City of New York, 1 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 1993). See also Apani Southwest v.
Coca-Cola Enters., 128 F. Supp. 2d 988 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that home rule is insufficient
to grant immunity).
127. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
128. Id. at 368.
129. Id.

130. Id.
131. S.C. Code Ann. § 5-23-10 (1976). Further, municipalities are granted the power for zoning by S.C. Code Ann. § 6-7-710. They may "regulate the location, height, bulk, number of
stories and size of buildings and other structures ....
The regulations shall ... be designed to
lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, and other dangers, to promote
the public health and the general welfare, to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the
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The Supreme Court relied on and affirmed Town of Hallie pointing
out that it suffices for the purposes of Parkerimmunity if "suppression
of competition is the 'foreseeable result' of what the statute authorizes". 32 According to the court, this condition was "amply" met in
133
this case.
Justice Scalia, writing for the court, rejected a conspiracy exception
to the Parker immunity, fearing compromising the States' ability to
regulate their domestic commerce. 134 Justice Stevens, dissenting,
pointed out the distinction between economic regulation and regula135
tion designed to protect the public health, safety, and environment.
Like Boulder's home rule, Justice Stevens asserted, the state's zoning
statutes should be deemed neutral on the question of whether the City
of Columbia is allowed to displace competition; a general grant of
power to enact ordinances should not necessarily imply a state author13 6
ization to enact specific anticompetitive ordinances.
Omni was recently examined by the Second Circuit in Electrical Inspectors, Inc. v. Village of East Hills.137 Several municipalities in the
State of New York required property owners to have their buildings
inspected solely by the New York Board of Fire Underwriters, thereby
granting the Board a de facto monopoly for fire inspections; the Uniform Fire Prevention and Building Code Act of the State of New York
and the applicable secretary's regulations required no such restriction. 138 The Circuit Court refused to inquire as to whether the city's
ordinance was actually authorized by state statute, i.e. whether the
city's act were ultra vires.139 The court held that it was sufficient if the
local enactment is within a broad view of the authority granted by the
overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to protect scenic areas; to
facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewage, schools, parks, and other public requirements". Id.
132. City of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 373; see also Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S.
34 , 42 (1985).
133. Id.: "The very purpose of zoning regulation is to displace unfettered business freedom in
a manner that regularly has the effect of preventing normal acts of competition, particularly on
the part of new entrants. A municipal ordinance restricting the size, location, and spacing of
billboards (surely a common form of zoning) necessarily protects existing billboards against
some competition from newcomers."
134. Id. at 377. See also Sandy River Nursing Care v. Aetna Cas., 985 F.2d 1138, 1144-45 (lst
Cir. 1993) (rejecting consideration of an alleged use of unlawful activity to coerce favorable
legislation for insurers as irrelevant for antitrust immunity). For a discussion of the conspiracy
exception, see infra Part IV.C.
135. City of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 387.
136. Id. at 393. See also Westborough Mall, Inc. v. Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733, 746 (8th
Cir. 1982); Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378, 379 (5th Cir. 1977).
137. 320 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 982 (2003).
138. Id. at 115.
139. Id. at 121 n.6.
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state.140 The court further concluded that "the plaintiff's complete ex-

clusion from the market for required electrical inspection services...
is a foreseeable result of a statute that requires municipalities to en141
force a uniform fire code and administrative regulations.'
The court did not address the question whether state action immunity would also cover the Board's conduct regarding extension of its
monopoly power into localities that have not made it the exclusive
provider of inspection services. The board had allegedly threatened
retaliation to customers using services of the plaintiff Electrical Inspectors, Inc. in localities where the Board had been granted exclusivity. Finally, the court held that the Village having the mere "negative
option" to replace the Board at any time was alone likely inadequate
supervision, and remanded the case for further inquiries in this
regard.

1 42

A more narrow reading of the foreseeability standard was applied
by the Fifth Circuit in Surgical Care Center of Hammond, L.C. v. Hospital Service Dist. No. 1 of TangipahoaParish.143 In this case, a Louisi-

ana statute enabled the hospital service district to form joint ventures
and to conduct closed meetings, thereby merely adding items to the
district's list of available powers. 144 The statute did not subject all
health care facilities to the authority of the hospital service district.
The court concluded that an insulation of the hospital service district
from the Sherman Act must be fairly signaled; such signal was not
given in the case at hand because joint ventures are not necessarily
anticompetitive. 1 45 With regard to the requirement to clearly articu-

late a state's anticompetitive policy, the court held that "it is not the
foreseeable result of allowing a hospital service district to form joint
140. Id. at 119-21 (arguing that it is a question for state authorities whether the act is actually
violative of the state statute; it is not a question of federal antitrust law). See also Consol. Tel.
Cable Serv., Inc. v. City of Frankfort, Ky., 857 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that ordinary
errors or abuses in the administration of powers conferred by the state should be left for state
tribunals to control.).
141. Elec. Inspectors, Inc., 320 F.3d at 121 (arguing that the regulation, by allowing municipalities to designate their own employees to carry out the inspection (town-operated monopoly),
would include possible exclusivity for a private party). See also Cine 42nd St. Theater Corp v.
Nederlander Org., Inc., 790 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1986). The Second Circuit held that the
power of an entity to contract implied leasing property in an anticompetitive manner; to reach
this decision, the court underscored the importance of the fact that the entity could dictate the
criteria for contracting; exemption from competitive bidding was not regarded as decisive. Anticompetitive Effects in secondary market, i.e. the Broadway Theater market, were also foreseeable. Id. at 1046-47.
142. Elec. Inspectors, Inc., 320 F.3d at 129.
143. 171 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 1999).
144. Id. at 233.
145. Id. at 235.
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ventures that it will engage in anticompetitive conduct. ' 146 The court
concluded that a mere grant of authority was not sufficient grant of
antitrust immunity for the hospital district's attempt to monopolize
47
outpatient surgical care.
In Earles v. State Bd. of Certified Public Accountants of Louisiana14 8, the Fifth Circuit held that a state board's authority to regulate
the practice of public accounting in the state of Louisiana "includes
the power to adopt rules that may have anticompetitive effects. It is
thus the 'foreseeable result' of enacting such a statute that the Board
1 49
may actually promulgate a rule that has anticompetitive effects."'
This rather broad application of the foreseeability standard was also
applied in Martin v. Memorial Hosp. at Gulfport. 50 In Martin, the
Fifth Circuit held that a Hospital's power "to enter a contract with an
individual physician to operate any aspect, division or department of
its operations" could have been reasonably anticipated by the Mississippi Legislature to result in anticompetitive conduct; for example, an
exclusive contract with an individual physician to supervise and per151
form the critical functions of medical units.
In Zimomra v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. 152 , the Tenth Circuit held
that the City and County of Denver's broad authority to regulate airport services and the embarkation of passengers to and from airports
was sufficient to impose an uniform usage fee on car rental services.
In Consolidated Television Cable Service, Inc. v. City of Frankfort,
Ky., the Sixth Circuit held that the requirement for public utilities,
including CATV services, to obtain a franchise from a municipality,
foreseeably resulted in displacement of competition and was, thus,
153
sufficient to grant immunity.
In Bolt, the Eleventh Circuit held that an alleged conspiracy of a
peer-review committee to deny hospital privileges on pretextual
grounds was not foreseeable by the state legislature. 154 Thus, this
146. Id..
147. Id. at 236. In this case, the court, en banc, reversed an earlier decision; in this earlier
decision, the court held that the state statute covered the conclusion of anticompetitive exclusive
contracts with managed care plans; see Surgical Care Ctr. of Hammond, L. C. v. Hosp. Serv. Dist.
No. I of Tangipahoa Parish, 153 F.3d 220, 223-225 (5th Cir. 1998).
148. 139 F.3d 1033, 1043 (5th Cir. 1998). The court argued further that the state board is
exempted from the supervision requirement. Id. at 1041.
149. Id. at 1042.
150. 86 F.3d 1391 (5th Cir. 1996).
151. Id. at 1400.
152. 111 F.3d 1495, 1501-03 (10th Cir. 1997).
153. 857 F.2d 354, 361 (6th Cir. 1988).
154. Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 825 (11th Cir. 1990).
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ultra vires conduct was not exempted from antitrust scrutiny. 155 Similarly, the allegedly anticompetitive conduct of the defendant Washington Natural Gas Co., i.e. off-tariff pricing, would not be protected by
the state action immunity doctrine if in violation of Washington
56
law.1
5 ? that the legisThe Ninth Circuit held in Hass v. Oregon State Bar1
lature's authorization of the Bar to compel all Oregon-based attorneys
to carry malpractice insurance, and to own, organize, and sponsor any
insurance organization was sufficient to establish an insurance monopoly of the Bar.
As one of several circuit courts dealing with the Multistate Settlement Agreement with the Tobacco Industry 158 , the Second Circuit denied extending state action immunity to the settlement in Freedom
Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer159 According to the Court, the output cartel
established by the settlement could "be immunized under the Parker
State Action Doctrine only where it regulated commerce in furtherance of legitimate state policy goals and limited unnecessary anticompetitive effects. '1 60 In a petition for rehearing, the court confirmed its
earlier opinion and explained that "a state must act in furtherance of
legitimate state policy goals and its acts must have a plausible nexus to
those goals."' 16 In contrast to previous court decisions, the Second
Circuit questioned the means applied to reach the state's policy goals;
the court noted "that the State denies any anti-competitive effect and
62
offers no explanation for the anti-competitive scheme.'
2.

Permissiveness in Identifying Clearly Articulated State Policies

The courts use different ways to probe the existence of a "clearly
articulated state policy", the "intent of the state to displace competi155. Id. at 824-25.
156. Cost Mgmt. Serv., Inc. v. Wash. Natural Gas Co., 99 F.3d 937, 942-43 (9th Cir. 1996).
157. 883 F.2d 1453, 1458-59 (9th Cir. 1989).
158. See Bedell Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 239, 260-65 (3d Cir. 2001).
See also Sanders v. Lockyer, 365 F.Supp.2d 1093 (N.D.Cal. 2005).
159. 357 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004).
160. Id. at 223. However, the court found it "doubtful that a federal court would upset a state
statute solely because it failed to meet the explanatory aspect of the first Midcal prong if it
passed muster in all other respects." Id. at 227. The court relied on the fact that the settlement
fails to provide for sufficient supervision. Id. at 231.
161. Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 363 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that a court
facing an antitrust challenge to a state statute allowing price-fixing by car washes is not obliged
to dismiss the complaint because the state asserts that the law will improve the performance of
the state capital city's symphony orchestra).
162. Freedom Holding, Inc., 357 F.3d at 229. Such an explanatory standard was rejected by
the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co, 428 U.S. 579, 610-11
(1976).
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tion", or "the intent of the state to establish an anticompetitive regulation". In September 2003, the State Action Task Force of the FTC
issued a report pointing out as a major flaw of the State Action Doctrine being that some courts accept the mere existence of a regulatory
scheme as intent to displace competition. 163 Thus, lower courts refuse
to apply the Sherman Act to formerly regulated industries where
there is still some state regulatory scheme, however incomplete it is.164
As FFC's discussion of relevant cases displays, more scrutiny is applied if courts conduct inquiries into whether the anticompetitive impact was a foreseeable result of the state authorization. 165 Many
courts conclude that a broad authorization by the state does cover
nearly any conduct in terms of foreseeability - the actual intent of the
state is hardly questioned. Furthermore, courts have acknowledged
that the power to acquire goods or conclude contracts may result in
166
the displacement of competition.
Fortunately, there are some examples in which courts have applied
a stricter standard, such as the Fifth Circuit in Hammond holding that
the power to form joint ventures does not foreseeably result in anticompetitive conduct.1 67 In general, the foreseeability standard has
proven to be of no bite - the broader the authority to act within a
particular subject matter, the more likely anticompetitive conduct will
168
be held to be the "foreseeable" result of the delegation.
Courts sometimes assume that regulatory regimes automatically displace all aspects of competition. Instead of inquiring into the scope of
a state policy with regard to the affected elements of competition, they
1 69
are satisfied if the conduct is within the broad authority of state law.
By refusing to delve deeper into questions of state law and proper
delegation, the federal courts broaden the possibilities for state regulators to displace competition, even where such displacement cannot

163. See

OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE

26

(2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf.

164. See Jim Rossi, supra note 10, at 551.
165. See OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, supra note 164, at 25-36.

166. Id. at 26-28 (citing Sterling Beef Co. v. City of Fort Morgan, 810 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1987)
and Indep. Taxicab Drivers' Employees v. Greater Houston Transp., 760 F.2d 607 (5th Cir.
1985)). See Phillip, E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, supra note 7. at 453 (arguing that ordinary
corporate powers do not contemplate antitrust violation).
167. 171 F.3d at 235. See also Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d
397 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding no intent to displace competition by mere authorization to engage in
business).
168. See Douglas C. Floyd, supra note 90, at 1076.
169. See supra note 141.
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be affirmatively said to be covered by a respective state intent. 170 Fortunately, there are some courts addressing alleged ultra vires
conduct.171
The Supreme Court keenly strengthened the clear articulation standard in Cantor, by arguing that a repeal of the antitrust laws is to be
regarded as implied only if necessary to make the act work, and even
then only to the minimum extent necessary.1 72 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has lost much of its courage displayed in the Cantor decision, and has not applied such a strict interpretation of permissible
anticompetitive state regulation again. As a comparative note, such
reluctance to restrict state regulation is not displayed in many other
jurisdictions. For example, a provision of the Swiss Antitrust Statute
regarding state action expressly states, analogously to the Cantor
holding, that state action may displace competition, but is limited to
the extent the state regulation really requires such displacement. Similarly, the European competition law applies a very narrow interpretation to governmental measures restricting competition. 173
In Boulder, the Court rejected the claim that a home rule statute
shows a clear intent of the state to displace competition, implementing
a rather strict standard. 174 This strict standard of a clearly articulated
state policy was later softened in two ways. On the one hand, the
court accepted in Southern Motor Carriers that the anticompetitive
conduct does not have to be compelled by the state. 175 On the other
hand, in Town of Hallie and Omni, the court did not require an express intent to displace competition -it was sufficient for the purpose
of granting immunity if the anticompetitive conduct was the foreseeable result of the state policy. 176 The softer standard may probably be
explained by the court's reluctance to apply the antitrust laws to mu170. See Office of Policy Planning, supra note 164, at 34 (citing Earles v. La. Bd. of Certified
Public Accountants, 139 F.3d 1033, 1043 (5th Cir. 1998). But see Hardy v. City Optical, 39 F.3d
765, 769 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a state "may have a regulatory program but one that can
coexist happily with the full enforcement of federal antitrust principles because the program
does not require the supplanting of competition"; citing Lancaster Community Hosp. v. Antelope
Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397 (9th Cir.1991)).
171. See Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 824-825 (11th Cir. 1990). See also Cost
Mgmt. Serv., Inc. v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 99 F.3d 937, 942-43 (9th Cir. 1996).
172. 428 U.S. at 596, n. 34.
173. Swiss Cartel Act [Kartellgesetz], SR 251, art. 3(1) (2006); see HELMUTH SCHROTER ET
AL., Commentary to Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the European Community [Kommentar
zu Art. 81 EGV], 263 (2003). For a discussion of the reasons of the U.S. Supreme Court's permissive holdings after Cantor, see infra, III.E. and IV.B.
174. Cmty. Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 56 (1982).
175. S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 50-52 (1985).
176. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 373 (1991); and Town
of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985).
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nicipalities; however, the softer standard is now valid for all defendants claiming immunity on grounds of state action.
We may thus conclude that the requirement of a clearly articulated
state policy to displace competition, in particular under the foreseeability standard, does not provide much restraint for state regulators.
D. Active Supervision by the State
1. State of the Law
The requirement of sufficient state supervision of anticompetitive
schemes is mainly governed by the quite recent ruling of the Supreme
Court in FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. 1 77 In this case, the respondent was
charged with horizontal price fixing in setting fees for title searches
and examinations. 1 78 In four States, a rating bureau, licensed by the
State and authorized to establish joint rates for its members, established uniform rates; submitted rates became effective unless the State
rejected them within a specified period. 1 79 The Court held that it was
not sufficient for the active supervision standard to establish that a
"state's program is in place, is staffed and funded, grants to the state
officials ample power and the duty to regulate pursuant to declared
standards of state policy, is enforceable in the state's courts, and demonstrates some basic level of activity directed towards seeing that the
private actors carry out the state's policy and not simply their own
policy". 18 0 A "party claiming the immunity must show that state officials have undertaken the necessary steps to determine the specifics of
the price-fixing or rate setting scheme. The mere potential for state
supervision is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the
Under this standard, the active supervision requirement
State."''
was not met since the rate bureaus merely checked the filings for
mathematical accuracy and requests for additional information were
182
not obeyed.
177. 504 U.S. 621, 646 (1992) (the FTC conceded that a clearly articulated state policy was
established by the states).
178. Id. at 624-625.
179. Id. at 629.
180. Id. at 637 (abrogating New England Motor Rate Bureau, Inc. v. FTC, 908 F.2d 1064, 1071
(1st Cir. 1990), which required only "some basic level of activity directed towards seeing that the
private actors carry out the state's policy" to satisfy supervision).
181. Id. at 638 (arguing that much as in causation inquiries, the analysis asks whether the State
has played a substantial role in determining the specifics of the economic policy; the question is
not how well state regulation works but whether the anticompetitive scheme is the State's own.).
182. Id.
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The Supreme Court also found the active supervision requirement
not met in Liquor Corp. v. Duffy. 18 3 A State of New York statute
required retailers to charge at least 112 % of the posted wholesale
price for liquor, but permitted wholesalers to sell to retailers at less
than the posted price. 184 The state legislature had clearly adopted a
policy of resale price maintenance, thereby meeting the first part of
the Midcal test. 185 However, the liquor pricing system was not supervised by the state since the price setting of private parties was simply
authorized and enforced by the state but the liquor authority neither
established prices nor reviewed the reasonableness of the price schedules, and did not monitor or reexamine market conditions. 186 These
were the same reasons that induced the court in Midcal to find the
California statute requiring all wine producers and wholesalers to file
fair trade contracts or price schedules with the State in violation of the
187
Sherman act.
Also, the Court held that if the supervised private party withholds
key information from the authority which was repeatedly requested
and which was needed in order to make an informed decision on
whether to approve a tariff, then the active supervision requirement
188
would probably not be met.
Patrick v. Burget 189 displays that it may be difficult for a state to
establish active supervision over self-governing entities. In Patrick,
the state failed to meet the supervision requirement for peer-review
proceedings of the Astoria Clinic, Oregon. The peer review committee voted to recommend the termination of petitioner's privileges on
the ground that petitioner's care of his patients was below the standards of the hospital, while petitioner claimed that his peers just
wanted to reduce competition at the hospital. 190 According to the
Court, the state exercised no active supervision since all involved state
183. 479 U.S. 335 (1987).
184. Id. at 337.
185. Id. at 344.
186. Id at 344 n.6. (arguing that a simple "minimum markup" requiring to charge 112 % of the
actual wholesale cost may satisfy the "active supervision" requirement, in contrast to the present
markup on the posted bottle price). See also Morgan v. Div. of Liquor Control, Conn. Dept. of
Bus. Regulation, 664 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1981) (granting immunity since the legislature did conduct
additional inquiries on the appropriate retail price, in contrast to the liquor authority of New
York.); Miller v. Or. Liquor Control Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1222, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding
that Oregon has failed to displace unfettered business freedom with its own power).
187. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105-106 (1980).
188. Cost Mgmt. Serv., Inc. v. Wash. Natural Gas Co., 99 F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 1996).
189. 486 U.S. 94 (1988). The clear articulation standard was not considered by the court. Id.
at 100.
190. Id. at 97-98.
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actors 91 lacked the ability to exercise ultimate control, i.e. to review
192
and overturn peer-review decisions.

The Court rejected the policy argument that effective peer review is
essential to the provision of quality medical care and that any threat
of antitrust liability would prevent physicians from participating
openly and actively in peer-review proceedings. 193 The Court reasoned that since the argument challenges the wisdom of applying the
antitrust laws to medical services it has to be directed to the legislative
branch.

194

The Eleventh Circuit, however, held in Crosby v. HospitalAuthority
of Valdosta and Lowndes County that a peer review committee of the

hospital was acting as an agent of the Hospital authority; in this case,
the authority retains the power to follow, modify, or even disregard
the recommendations of staff committees, thereby adopting the actions of the committee as its own actions. 195
In Bedell Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc.19 6, the Third Circuit held that private participants in the Multistate Settlement Agree-

ment between the States and the tobacco companies are not shielded
from antitrust claims. The court found that state supervision does not
reach provisions regarding price fixing and provisions enabling cigarette producers to establish an output cartel; advertisement restrictions did not have effects on pricing. 197 The court also addressed the
191. This includes state courts, the review of which would probably be of a very limited nature; id. at 103-06.
192. Id. at 100-01: "The requirement is designed to ensure that the state-action doctrine will
shelter only the particular anticompetitive acts of private parties that, in the judgment of the
State, actually further state regulatory policies. To accomplish this purpose, the active supervision requirement mandates that the State exercise ultimate control over the challenged anticompetitive conduct. The mere presence of some state involvement or monitoring does not suffice.
The active supervision prong of the Midcal test requires that state officials have and exercise
power to review particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and disapprove those that fail
to accord with state policy. Absent such a program of supervision, there is no realistic assurance
that a private party's anticompetitive conduct promotes state policy, rather than merely the
party's individual interests."
193. Id. at 105.
194. Id.
195. 93 F.3d 1515, 1531 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the committee enjoys the same immunity as the authority). See also Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1462 (11th
Cir. 1991) (relying entirely on the state's authorization of the denial of staff privileges by the
hospital).
196. 263 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2001).
197. Id. at 260-65. See also Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004). But
see Sanders v. Lockyer, 365 F.Supp.2d 1093 (N.D.Cal. 2005) (finding that the Multistate Settlement Agreement itself is a sovereign act of the state of California).
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possibility of a "market participant" exception to Parker, an issue
198
which will be addressed below.

Circuit Court decisions indicate that municipal supervision may be
sufficient to trigger state action immunity, where such supervision is
authorized by or is implicit in state legislation. 199 In ElectricalInspectors, the Second Circuit held that active supervision by municipalities

is required to grant state-action immunity in municipal contexts. 2°°
The court held that the mere negative option to replace a board is
alone likely to be insufficient for supervision. 20 1 The court also raised
the question whether lack of municipal supervision, triggering antitrust liability for involved private actors, may also affect the involved
municipalities. 20 2 The question is still not resolved.
In Town of Hallie, the Supreme Court held that the active state supervision requirement should not be imposed in cases in which the
actor is a municipality; the danger that a municipality would seek to
further purely parochial public interests was deemed minimal by the
court, because of the requirement that the municipality act pursuant
to a clearly articulated state policy. 20 3 The Court reasoned further
that it was likely that active state supervision would also not be re204
quired for state agencies.
Circuit Courts have granted to subdivisions of the state (if not
treated as the state for antitrust purposes anyway) similar exemptions
from the supervision requirement as granted to municipalities. 20 5 The
198. Bedell Wholesale Co., Inc., 263 F.3d at 265 n.55 (not applying such exception in the context of the Multistate Settlement Agreement, since the States did not enter the tobacco market
as a buyer or seller, nor did they assume control or ownership of any entity within the market).
199. Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 998 F.2d 1073, 1079 (1st Cir. 1993). See also
Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985); Tom Hudson & Assocs. v. City of Chula Vista, 746 F.2d 1370 (9th
Cir.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1028 (1985); Savage v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1505
(D.S.C. 1985). But see, e.g., Riverview Invs., Inc. v. Ottawa Cmty. Improvement Corp., 774 F.2d
162 (6th Cir. 1985) (revising an earlier decision with regard to the sufficiency of municipal
supervision).
200. Elec. Inspectors, Inc. v. Viii. of East Hills, 320 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 982 (2003); but see Commuter Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth.,
801 F.2d 1286, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 1986) (arguing that the power to remove members of a authority would be sufficient supervision).
201. Id.
202. Elec. Inspectors, Inc. 320 F.3d at 122, 129.
203. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 (1985).
204. Id. at 46 n.10 (not deciding the issue).
205. Cine 42nd St. Theater Corp v. Nederlander Org., Inc., 790 F.2d 1032, 1047 (2d Cir. 1986)
(citing Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46 n.10); Interface Group, Inc. v. Ma. Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9
(1st Cir. 1987) (granting exemption from supervision to the Massachusetts Port Authority); Commuter Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 801 F.2d 1286, 1290-91 (11th Cir.
1986) (holding that the Authority is subject to state "sunshine" laws, has police power jurisdic-
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Eleventh Circuit for example, in Bankers Insurance Co. v. Florida
Residential Property and Casualty Joint Underwriting Ass'n, 20 6 held

that "factors favoring political-subdivision treatment include open
records, tax exemption, exercise of governmental functions, lack of
possibility of private profit, and the composition of the entity's decisionmaking structure."
Similarly, in Earles v. State Board. of Certified Public Accountants
of Louisiana,20 7 the Fifth Circuit granted exemption from supervision
to a state board, holding it functionally similar to a municipality. Further, in Martin v. Memorial Hospital at Gulfport, the Fifth Circuit also
granted an exemption from supervision to a Hospital, holding it "a
subdivision of the state or municipal corporation thereof". 208 In Hass,

the Ninth Circuit exempted the State Bar from the active supervision
requirement because its record were open for public inspection, its
accounts and financial affairs were subject to audits by a state auditor,
its meetings were open to the public, and its Board members were
public officials who had to comply with the Code of Ethics enacted by
the state legislature to guide the conduct of all public officials. 20 9

In Zimomra, the Tenth Circuit applied the single-prong Town of
Hallie test (without supervision) to a private defendant because defendant's actions were mandated and strictly controlled by the City and
County of Denver via the applicable Ordinance.2 10
In dealing with a rural electric convenience cooperative, the Seventh Circuit held in Fuchs v. Rural Electric Convenience Co-op. Inc.
that the entity lacked the attributes of a purely private actor; 21 1 how-

ever, the court found that it is neither a state agency nor municipality.
Being a hybrid entity with sufficient non-private attributes, the court
held that its activities required some lower level of supervision to ention, power of eminent domain, zoning authority, bonding authority, rulemaking power and is
exempt from taxation. According to the court, there is also sufficient state supervision: The governor appoints, and may remove for cause, all the regular members of the Authority.).
206. 137 F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 1998).
207. 139 F.3d 1033, 1041 (5th Cir. 1998).
208. 86 F.3d 1391, 1399 (5th Cir. 1996). See also FTC v. Hosp. Bd. of Dirs. of Lee County, 38
F.3d 1184, 1188 (11th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a health care authority was a "political subdivision" exempted from supervision because it was a special purpose unit of local government);
Crosby v. Hosp. Auth. of Valdosta and Lowndes County, 93 F.3d 1515, 1525 (lth Cir. 1996)
(holding that the mere grant of powers resembling a private corporation does not transform an
otherwise governmental entity into a private actor of the type the court would expect to engage
in a private price-fixing agreement; the exemption covers employees of the hospital as well, but
not necessarily a peer review committee acting independently); Consol. Tel. Cable Serv., Inc. v.
City of Frankfort, Ky. 857 F.2d 354, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1988).
209. Hass v. Or. State Bar, 883 F.2d 1453, 1460 (1989).
210. Zimora v. Alamo Rent-a-Car, Inc., 111 F.3d 1495, 1499-1501 (1997).
211. 858 F.2d 1210, 1217-18 (7th Cir. 1988).
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sure that it is acting pursuant to state policy.212 Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit exempted a private, charitable corporation incorporated under
the laws of the State of Nevada by direction of the Washoe County
21 3
District Board of Health from the active supervision requirement.
An exemption from active supervision may also be granted if the actor
2 t4
has only very limited discretionary authority.
2.

Incoherence in Determining the Degree of
Required Supervision

Without doubt, Ticor - as well as Patrick21 5 - have strengthened the
active supervision requirement. In Ticor, the Supreme Court rejected
the holding of the First Circuit that the mere potential for state supervision is enough to invoke immunity. 216 It is not sufficient that the
defendant establishes that a state program is in place, that it is staffed
and funded, and that state officials have ample power to regulate and
demonstrate some "basic level of activity".2 17 "The party claiming the
immunity must show that state officials have undertaken the necessary
steps to determine the specifics of the price-fixing or ratesetting
scheme."2 18 As Paul Posner has noted, the state has to secure a certain quality of the review process, which requires rejection of all procedures that are ineffective or shallow, as when agencies have become
rubber stamps.2 19 However, the Supreme Court failed to provide
clear guidance how much supervision is sufficient to meet the
22 0
requirement.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court opened a loophole in the active
supervision requirement by exempting municipalities from supervision. 22 1 The court reasoned that there is little or no danger that the
municipality was involved in a private price-fixing arrangement, and
212. Id. at 1217.
213. Ambulance Serv. of Reno, Inc. v. Nev. Ambulance Serv, Inc., 819 F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir.
1987).
214. Mun. Utils. Bd. of Albertville v. Ala. Power Co., 934 F.2d 1493, 1503-04 (11th Cir. 1991).
215. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100-01 (1988) (holding that the "test requires that state
officials have and exercise power to review particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and
disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy").
216. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 632 (1992).
217. Id. at 637.
218. Id. at 638.
219. See Paul S. Posner, supra note 8, at 723.
220. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 647 (Justice O'Connor, dissenting). See also Jeffrey M. Cross & Patrick
J. Ahern, FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance: Supreme Court puts State Action immunity under the
Lens, 7 Antitrust, Fall/Winter 1992, 24, at 25 (1992).
221. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 (1985). See also Phillip E. Areeda &
Herbert Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 397 (regarding this development as inevitable consequence of the "common law" method of adjudication through successive decisions).
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only a minimal danger that the municipality will seek to further purely
parochial public interests at the expense of more overriding state
goals. 2 2 2 Yet, the Court seemed to ignore the high risk of interest
group capture at the local level, "where incentives for ex ante lobby223
ing are perhaps strongest".
Based on a footnote in Town of Hallie224, lower courts extended the
exemption from supervision to state agencies and other political subdivisions of the state. While case law is still clear that private actors
are subject to the supervision requirement, it is still unclear which hybrid or local entities are exempted from supervision. There are no
uniformly applied or even clear criteria to determine the status of
these entities. 225 It is also doubtful whether courts may find a clear
standard to determine which entities are unlikely to pursue parochial
interests. In fact, it may be easier to require some degree of state
supervision for all entities engaging in anticompetitive conduct based
on state regulation.
Also, the courts struggle to assess the required degree of supervision if a private actor is supervised by a municipality. Indeed, some
scholars argue that the courts require relatively little from municipally
supervised parties to grant immunity and that courts should also apply
226
the principles of state supervision to municipally supervised parties.
Summarizing, we may conclude that the active supervision requirement does not provide guidance with regard to the scope of entities
needing supervision and to the extent such supervision has to be applied; there is no uniform standard established for supervision.
III.

IMPACT OF THE APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS ON
REGULATED MARKETS

In most cases, the federal courts pay deference to state regulation
and state regulators (A). This may be partly explained by the vagueness of the Midcal-test, which provides little guidance for courts, regulators, regulated parties, and possible competitors (B). The vagueness
of the standard affects considerations of justice and fairness (C),
which are made worse by the threat of treble damages in antitrust
lawsuits (D). Given the uncertainty of the present standard, we may
222. Town of Hattie, 471 U.S. at 47.
223. See Jim Rossi, supra note 9, at 549; See also William J. Martin, State Action Antitrust
Immunity for Municipally Supervised Parties, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1085 (2005).
224. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46 n.10.
225. See Office of Policy Planning, supra note 164, at 37-38 (such criteria are, e.g., the purpose
of the entity, open records, tax exemption, exercise of governmental functions, etc.).
226. See William J. Martin, supra note 224, at 1081.
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welcome more foreseeable results, even if this means having to conduct delicate inquiries of the reasons behind state regulation (E).
A.

Deference to Regulators and Regulated Actors

In U.S. v. Topco Associates, Inc.,227 the Supreme Court showed a
strong commitment to the Sherman Act stating its high expectations
as follows:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the
Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the
Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no
matter how small, is the freedom to compete - to assert with vigor,
imagination,228devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it
can muster.
The Sherman Act, as it has been interpreted by the courts, sets strict
limits for private actors engaging in anticompetitive conduct. The Supreme Court was never hesitant to recognize the vast federal interest
in preserving competition. In Cantor, the Supreme Court even argued
that if the state imposed regulation inconsistent with the antitrust
laws, it "could not accept the view that the federal interest must inevitably be subordinated to the State's. '229 Also, Justice Stevens, dissenting in Southern Motor Carriers,230 pointed out that "[r]egulated
industries are not per se exempt from the Sherman Act." Yet, it has
always seemed clear that federal antitrust laws may not be applied the
231
same way to state action as to private action.
Despite all of its strong commitments, the Supreme Court has generally refused to apply the strict limits of the Sherman Act to the regulating states. In Southern Motor Carriers,Justice Powell argued that
"[t]he Parkerdecision was premised on the assumption that Congress,
in enacting the Sherman Act, did not intend to compromise the States'
ability to regulate their domestic commerce. ' 232 By recognizing the
states' power to regulate intrastate commerce and interstate commerce by using the dormant commerce clause, the Supreme Court had
to find a way to reconcile the federal interest in unfettered competi227. 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
228. Id.
229. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 595 (1976).
230. S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S, 48, 68 (1985) (citing
Ga. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456 (1945)).
231. See Paul S. Posner, supra note 8, at 703-07 (explaining the differences between state
action and private action).
232. 471 U.S. at 56. See also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 351 (1943) (holding that "[tihere is no
suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in the Act's legislative history.").
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tion with the states' interest to enact regulation in public interest. In
Parker, the Court put a limit on state regulation by declaring that the
state may "not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act
by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is
lawful. '233 However, the Court indicated that it would it would pay
deference to a state, acting through its agents, which adopts a program
and which enforces it with penal sanctions, in the execution of its pol234
icy goals.
Later in Midcal, the Supreme Court explained that a state can not
thwart the national policy in favor of competition by casting a gauzy
235
cloak of state involvement over private anticompetitive conduct.
Where private actors, regulatory boards, and other non-sovereign actors are claiming to execute state policy, they must follow a "clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy," and they must
be "actively supervised" by the State itself.236 In other words, the Supreme Court will yield the federal interest to the states' interest, so
long as the states' policy is not deemed to be ultimately of purely private origin (hybrid restraints237 ). Still, some commentators argue that
courts impose a costly system of "command and control" regulation
on the states as the price of obtaining antitrust immunity for their regulatory regimes. This could prevent the states from implementing
2 38
these programs in the first place.
The broad deference to state regulators in Parker reflects the
Court's general confidence in government at that time, "with governmental entities widely regarded as unbiased and conscientious defenders of public interest. '239 We may trace back the court's deference to
the "Public Interest Theory", which was dominant back in these early
cases. 240 Some scholars describe this still existing, general judicial reluctance to intervene in disputes involving political institutions as a
"deference trap", creating a strong presumption of no judicial intervention. 24 1 This deference was confirmed by Town of Hallie, in which
the Court argued that, absent a showing to the contrary, a municipal233. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
234. Id. at 352.
235. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980).
236. Id. at 105.
237. Fisher v. Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 267-68 (1986) (quoting Rice v. Norman Williams Co.,
458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982). See also Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345 n.8 (1987).
238. See Douglas C. Floyd, supra note 90, at 1061.
239. See John T. Delacourt & Todd J. Zywicki, The FTC and State Action: Evolving Views on
the Proper Role of Government, 72 ANTITRUST L. J. 1075, 1075 (2005).
240. Id. at 1077-79.
241. See Jim Rossi, Moving Public Law out of the Deference Trap in Regulated Industries, 40
Wake Forest L. Rev., 2005, 617.
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ity is presumed to act in the public interest. 242 The Court underscored
that "municipal conduct is invariably more likely to be exposed to
public scrutiny than is private conduct. Municipalities in some States
are subject to 'sunshine' laws or other mandatory disclosure regulations, and municipal officers, unlike corporate heads, are checked to
some degree through the electoral process. Such a position in the
public eye may provide some greater protection against antitrust
243
abuses than exists for private parties."
B.

Standard Bears Little Guidance

Before turning to the question of how the State Action Doctrine, as
applied by the courts, affects fairness and justice, it is important to
assess how much guidance the State Action Doctrine provides to regulated parties. The first chapter of this paper shows that the Midcal
test is not applied in a consistent, uniform manner by the lower courts
as well as the Supreme Court. 244 If anticompetitive regulation is not
imposed directly by the state or by one of its subdivisions, affected
private actors may have difficulties predicting whether they are
shielded from antitrust immunity. 245 If the court fails to provide clear
standards, it simply "substitutes its own policy judgment about the desirability of disregarding any facet of state economic regulation that it
'246
thinks unwise or of no great importance.
In Ticor, Justice O'Connor challenged the court's determination regarding lack of sufficient active supervision by the state. 247 O'Connor,
dissenting, argued that the majority does not offer any guidance as to
what level of supervision would suffice. 248 She continued that the
"substantial role" standard is not only ambiguous, but also runs the
risk of being counterproductive. 249 In her opinion, the more reasonable a rate schedule filed by the regulated entity with the authority, the
less likely that a State will have to play any role other than simply
242. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 45 (1985). See also Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 594 (1976).
243. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 45 n.9.
244. See also OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, supra note 164, at 26; John T. Delacourt & Todd
J. Zywicki, supra note 240, at 1087-89.
245. See Cantor, 428 U.S. at 640 (J. Stewart, dissenting) (arguing that a state regulated utility
"must at its peril successfully divine which of its countless and interrelated tariff provisions a
federal court will ultimately consider 'central' or 'imperative.' If it guesses wrong, it may be
subjected to treble damages as a penalty for its compliance with state law.").
246. Id.
247. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 646 (1992).
248. Id

249. Id.
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reviewing the rate for compliance with statutory criteria. 250 While
Ticor clarified the supervision requirement for extreme cases, we still
do not know how to apply the standard in difficult but less than extreme cases. The supervision requirement probably bears only little
25 1
guidance for the bulk of possible cases.
C. Impact on Promotion of Fairnessand Justice
The weak guidance of the State Action Doctrine for regulated parties has a negative impact on fairness and justice. In Cantor, the Supreme Court was confronted with the claim that, "if a private citizen
has done nothing more than obey the command of his state sovereign,
it would be unjust to conclude that he has thereby offended federal
law. '2 52 The court argued that "there may be cases in which the
State's participation in a decision is so dominant that it would be unfair to hold a private party responsible for his conduct in implementing it"253 Such a dominant position, excluding any liability of private
parties, would probably be assumed in cases like Fisher v. City of
Berkeley.2 54 However, the Court deemed the private party in Cantor
to exercise sufficient freedom of choice to be held responsible for the
25 5
consequences of its decision.
It seems fair that compelling state action may not trigger antitrust
liability for obeying private actors.2 56 Antitrust immunity, however,
has been extended in cases where anticompetitive behavior was only
"prompted" but not compelled by a state. 257 In Southern Motor Carriers2 58 , the Supreme Court granted state action immunity to private
parties, although their joint rate filings were authorized, but not compelled by the state. This extension of state action immunity makes it
even more difficult for regulated parties, compared to Cantor, to assess their antitrust exposure.
250. Id. at 647.
251. See also William J. Martin, supra note 224, at 1087-88.
252. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 592.
253. Id. at 594-95.
254. 475 U.S. 260 (1986). In this case, the City of Berkeley unilaterally imposed rent ceilings
via an ordinance on landlords to the exclusion of private control. The ordinance placed complete control over maximum rent levels exclusively in the hands of a Rent Stabilization Board.
Id.
255. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 594.

256. See Fisher,475 U.S. 260 (holding that unilaterally imposed behavior does not violate the
Sherman Act).
257. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975).
258. S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 50-52 (1985).
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The dissent of Justice Stewart in Cantor pointed out that now, a
"public utility company, pervasively regulated by a state utility commission, may be held liable for treble damages under the Sherman Act
for engaging in conduct which, under the requirements of its tariff, it
is obligated to perform. '259 The dissent was also concerned that effective and efficient regulation may be hampered because such regula2 60
tion depends on active participation of the regulated parties.
Concerns regarding fairness and promotion of effective regulation
were also expressed by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor in Ticor.
Justice Rehnquist noted that the exposition of regulated actors to
treble damages will make it highly unlikely that that private actors will
choose to participate in such a joint filing. 2 61 Justice O'Connor joined
in, adding that "regulated entities that have the option of heeding the
State's anticompetitive policy would be foolhardy to do so; those that
are compelled to comply are less fortunate. ' 262 O'Connor argued further that an after-the-fact evaluation of a state's regulatory program is
"extremely unfair" to regulated parties.263 Antitrust liability would
then depend on how "enthusiastically" a state official carried out his
or her statutory duties, something over which the regulated entity has
no control. 264 The different degree of supervision applied by states
could result in antitrust liability of a private actor in one state, but not
265
in another.
Summarizing, there may be many cases where application of antitrust laws to regulated parties may be appropriate. In other cases,
particularly where anticompetitive behavior is compelled by a state,
the application of antitrust laws may appear unfair. In most cases,
however, it is difficult to draw a clear line where private involvement
is sufficient to trigger antitrust liability. The State Action Doctrine is
too vague to provide clear guidance for regulated parties.
D.

Treble Damages Threat to Regulated Parties

A state utility commission may be held liable for treble damages
under the Sherman Act for engaging in conduct which it is obligated
to perform. 266 Such application may result in a disruption of operation of a state-regulated public utility company by creating the pros259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Cantor, 428 U.S. at 614-15.
Id. at 627.
FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 644 (1992).
Id. at 646.
Id. at 647.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., 428 U.S. 579 at 614-15 (Justice Stewart, dissenting).
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pect of massive treble damage liabilities, payable ultimately by the
267
companies' customers.
Similarly, in Boulder, dissenting Justice Rehnquist claimed that the
application of antitrust laws to municipalities will "impede, if not paralyze, local governments' efforts to enact ordinances and regulations
aimed at protecting public health, safety, and welfare, for fear of sub268
jecting the local government to liability under the Sherman Act.
Because of policy reasons and fairness considerations, the concern of
exposure to treble damages was also shared by Paul Posner, who
of
asked for a privilege against damage liability for good-faith actions
2 69
regulation.
state
under
operating
or
securing
in
firms
private
The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984270 addresses some of
the concerns which have been expressed by Justice Rehnquist in Boulder. The act removes the danger of treble damages for local governments, encompassing cities, counties, parishes, towns, townships,
villages, school districts, sanitary districts, or any other general function governmental unit.2 71 Under the statute, no damages, interest on
damages, costs, or attorney's fees may be recovered from any local
government, or official or employee thereof acting in an official capacity. 272 The statute, however, does not preclude the right to an injunc273
tion, and a prevailing plaintiff may recover attorney's fees.
While the statute removes the most severe remedy - damages - for
local governments, it leaves many questions unanswered. In light of
Omni's rejection of a conspiracy exception, 274 one such question
would be in which cases an official is not "acting in an official capacity". Secondly, the applicability of the exception to private parties,
which may violate the Sherman Act by carrying out the municipal
command, remains unclear. Finally, the act does not deal at all with
the scope of antitrust immunity conferred on municipalities under the
State Action Doctrine.
The threat of treble damages may reduce the willingness of private
parties to cooperate in drafting regulations or to carry out public policy. It is much more costly for regulated actors if they have wrongly
267.
268.
brook,
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id. at 615.
Cmty. Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 60 (1982). See also Frank H. Eastersupra note 1, at 38 and 40 (taking a more deferential approach).
See Paul S. Posner, supra note 8, at 729.
15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36.
Id.
Id.
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION

AND ITS PRACTICE 753 (2005) (citing several Circuit Courts' decisions).

274. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 375 (1991).
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assessed their chance of liability under the vague standard set by the
275
Supreme Court.
E.

"Lochner" Consequences?

Lochner v. New York 276 stands for an era when the Supreme Court
invalidated - on grounds of Substantive Due Process - state laws that
interfered with the freedom to contract. The Lochner era represented
a major confrontation between the Supreme Court and the other
branches of Government, ending with the Court's total withdrawal
from scrutinizing economic regulation. 277 The times when "when the
Due Process Clause was used by this Court to strike down laws which
were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible with some
particular economic or social philosophy" are over. 278 This said, one
of the few remaining promising grounds on which to attack state regulation is showing that the regulation violates federal antitrust laws.
The question then arises whether this constitutes the same "undue"
influence of courts on economic policy as in the Lochner cases. In
Cantor, for example, dissenting Justice Stewart argued that, "[i]n
adopting this freewheeling approach to the language of the Sherman
Act, the Court creates a statutory simulacrum of the substantive due
process doctrine I thought had been put to rest long ago. ' 279
In Boulder, dissenting Justice Rehnquist discussed the legal nature
and the consequences of the Parkerimmunity at length. 280 He feared
that, should the immunity be construed as exemption rather than preemption, a municipality could be forced to justify the anticompetitive
effects of its regulation by proving its benefits to society under a rule
of reason. 28 1 The courts would have to assess whether the benefits of
the regulation to the community, in terms of traditional health, safety,
and public welfare concerns, outweigh the anticompetitive effects. 2 2
Social regulation would be subject to a review based on a "wide-ranging, essentially standardless inquiry into the reasonableness of local
275. While denial of State Action immunity does not equal a per se violation of the Sherman
Act, the mere possibility of being exposed to Sherman Act lawsuits may constitute a significant
burden.
276. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
277. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379, 399 (1937).
278. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963).
279. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 640 (1976). See also Ferguson, 372 U.S. at
728-29.
280. Cmty. Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 65-70 (1982).
281. Id. at 60.
282. Id. at 66.
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regulation". 28 3 In Rehnquist's opinion, "[t]he Sherman Act should
not be deemed to authorize federal courts to 'substitute their social
and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are
elected to pass laws."' 284 Indeed, state policies are often written
broadly, and courts think they might be ill-suited to determine
whether private conduct fits within the purposes of a specific law or
policy. 28 5 Some scholars argue, based on this argument, that the State
Action Doctrine should not be used at all to overturn regulation, or
286
any other results of the political process.
However, the reason for the Court's refusal to sit as a "superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation" 287 may be questioned. First
of all, the Supreme Court is not hesitant to question the wisdom of
legislation if non-economic issues are scrutinized. There is no reason
why the Supreme Court should be more apt to protect privacy as op2 88
posed to economic liberties.
Second, there is no logic in the conclusion that the Court has to pay
deference to anticompetitive state regulation just because no standard
exists; no standard would justify both, deference to state regulation as
well as deference to federal interests. The Court could decide that
every kind of state regulation displacing competition pre-empts the
Sherman Act; this would be the only way to avoid inquiries whether
state regulation is reasonable, i.e. whether its social benefits outweigh
its anticompetitive effects. However, there seems to be no valid reason why such inquiry should not take place as long as the states' constitutional powers to regulate commerce are not entirely destroyed, as
during the Lochner era.
Third, we may cast doubt on the Court's implied assumption that
the political process is able to restrain anticompetitive state regulation. Representatives are not elected just because they did or did not
promote rate regulation for, e.g., motor carriers. Regulation may
serve special interests, while its effects are dispersed widely in the
public. Public Choice Theory suggests that special interest groups find
283. Id. at 67.
284. Id. at 68 (citing Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 730). See also Page I. Austin, The State Action
Doctrine and the Sufficiency of State Regulation, 5 Antitrust, Summer 1991, 38 (1991) (reviewing
several court decisions expressing unease in trying the regulator).

285. See William J. Martin, supra note 224, at 1086.
286. See Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political
Process, 96 YALE L. J. 486, 519 (1987) (exempting only delegations to private actors from
immunity).

287. Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 731.
288. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 481-82 (2001); Paul R. Verkuil, State
Action, Due Process,and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 329

(1987).
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it easier to organize and lobby for favorable regulation, while the politicians' likelihood to get punished by voters remains small. Keeping
in mind that regulators are even more distant from the electorate, the
political process may not be powerful enough to influence anticompetitive regulation.
Moreover, there is not even a theoretical possibility of being held
responsible by the electorate if the anticompetitive effects of the state
regulation occur in other states. 2 89 In Parker,the California Agricultural Prorate Act affected the price of raisins, of which between 90 to
95 % were ultimately shipped in interstate or foreign commerce. 290
Such regulatory burdens carried by consumers in other states - sometimes addressed as "interstate spillovers" or "negative externalities" are largely ignored in the reasonings of the courts. 2 91 The report of
the State Action Task Force also pointed out that similar spillovers
occur in municipal regulation. 292 Some scholars focus exclusively on
this point and want courts to deny state action immunity to regulation
with significant state spillovers unsupported by a negotiated interstate
agreement. 293 Such an approach would honor the roots of Parker,
which are grounded in federalism.
The lack of political accountability in case of regulatory spillovers is
displayed in City of Lafayette, where the court observed that a municipality may charge higher rates to customers outside the geographical
scope of regulated tariffs. 294 By doing this, it "would provide maximum benefits for its constituents, while disserving the interests of the
''2 95
affected customers.
The effects of interstate spillovers were also neglected in Goldfarb.2 9 6 In this case, the Supreme Court acknowledged, at first, the
effect of the involved state action on interstate commerce. 297 The
Court rejected the argument of the county bar that the effects of its
289. Easterbrook seems to suggest that competition among the states may replace electoral
accountability and may result in better regulation. Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 33-55.
290. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 345 (1943).
291. See OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, supra note 164, at 40, 56-57 (requesting a more thorough recognition and consideration of spillover issues in case law).
292. Id. at 40-44.
293. See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action
Doctrine: Balancing Political Participationand Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism,75

TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1297-98 (1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 39-40 (arguing that
competition among jurisdictions would be facilitated by prohibition on the export of monopoly
charges).

294. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 404 (1978).
295. Id.
296. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 783 (1975) (abrogating the fee schedule since it
was not compelled by direction of state acting as a sovereign).
297. Id.
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fee schedule on interstate commerce were only incidental and remote
in order to conclude that the challenged behavior was within the reach
of the federal antitrust laws.298 Unfortunately, the court did not consider the anticompetitive effects of the state action to assess the valid299
ity of the state action under Parker.
The affected electorate outside the jurisdiction of the regulator is
not able to assert its interest by electing representatives who are
favorable to their interests. Their only way to attack these spillovers is
to file a lawsuit in a federal court. While interstate spillovers may be
addressed in court by claiming a violation of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, it may be much more difficult to address municipal spillovers.
Also, it may be impossible to state a case under the Dormant Commerce Clause in cases lacking blatant discrimination. 30 0 Keeping in
mind the loopholes in the Clause (e.g. if states are acting as market
participants themselves) and the Clause's overarching goal to prevent
discrimination, it seems misguided that the Dormant Commerce
to promote competition
Clause could serve as constitutional30mandate
1
regulation.
excessive
abrogating
by
As a comparative note, we may keep in mind that the European
Union fights interstate spillovers successfully by subjecting state regulation under the strict regime of article 28-30 of the Treaty establishing
the European Community. 30 2 According to article 28-29 of the Treaty,
quantitative restrictions on imports, exports, and all measures having
equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States. 30 3 Exceptions have to be justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans,
animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and
commercial property. 30 4 However, such prohibitions or restrictions
shall not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised

298. Id.
299. See Id.
300. See Jim Rossi, supra note 10, at 529 (arguing that challenges against public utility laws
were infrequent; when challenges were brought, federal courts typically deferred to state and
local regulation).
301. Id. at 534-36 (arguing that the dormant commerce clause responds to an implicit bargaining failure in the market for interjurisdictional regulation).
302. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C325) 33, art.
28-30 (hereinafter Treaty Establishing the European Community).
303. Art. 28-29 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.
304. Art. 30 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.
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restriction on trade between Member States. 30 5 This constitutes a
30 6
much stronger version of the United States' Commerce Clause.
F. Preliminary Conclusion
In summary, the State Action Doctrine addresses the need for a
standard to separate the realms of the federal interest of unfettered
competition and the states' interests of regulating domestic commerce.
However, today's State Action Doctrine constitutes a vague standard,
providing little guidance to regulated entities as well as regulators.
Particularly, the threat of treble damages may affect fairness considerations, since regulated entities are held responsible for anticompetitive behavior which they may even be compelled to perform. The fear
of a new Lochner era, as mentioned by the courts, is not very convincing in explaining the courts' refusal to inquire whether state regulation
is reasonable. We may note that the European Court of Justice requires state competition authorities to invalidate national legislation
which compels or facilitates conduct contrary to article 81 of the treaty
establishing the European Community. 30 7 There seems little reason
to adopt an approach in the U.S, which is more deferential towards
state actors.
The above concerns regarding the impact of denied state action immunity on regulated actors may explain why the courts have adopted
a rather permissive approach, being deferential to state regulators and
30 8
neglecting the goals of competition law.

IV.

ALTERNATIVES TO DETERMINE STATE ACTION IMMUNITY

In contrast to the findings of the State Action Task Force of the
FTC, as summarized below in (A), a mere refinement of the State
Action Doctrine and the Midcal test will not resolve the issues described in section III. If the federal antitrust laws should be given
more bite and if deference to state regulators should be decreased,
courts have to start looking behind the reasons of state regulation.
They have to assess whether regulation addresses legitimate concerns
305. Cf. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GUIDE TO THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF
ARTICLES 28-30 EC 8-21 (2001), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/regulation/goods/docs/art2830/guideart2830_en.pdf (summarizing the case law of the European Court
of Justice).
306. See Margaret Bloom, The U.S. and EU move towards substantial Antitrust Convergence
on Consumer Welfare based Enforcement, 19 Antitrust, Summer 2005, 18, at 23 (2005).
307. Id. See Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi v. Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del
Marcato, Case C-198/01, 2003 E.C.R. 1-08055 (dealing with a state imposed monopoly in
matches).
308. See Jim Rossi, supra note 10, at 555-56.
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of state policy, and whether these concerns outweigh the regulation's
harmful effects (B). Courts would also have to combat abuses of regulatory power (C). Taking into account the reluctance of courts to
scrutinize state regulation or resolve conflicts of interests of state regulators, the FTC may be well-suited to spearhead challenges to state
regulation (D).
A.

State Action Task Force: Refine the Existing Test

The State Action Task Force of the FTC did not share the skepticism against Parker (as expressed by scholars, 30 9 and, e.g., Justice
Scalia in Ticor31°). The Task Force's research resulted in rather pragmatic recommendations regarding further refinement of the State Action Doctrine, 31 1 which address the most severe problems already
identified above.
First, the Task force recommended a stricter application of the clear
articulation standard. 3 12 It asserted that courts jump too quickly from
finding a general regulatory scheme to concluding that such a scheme
intends to displace competition. It also argued that the foreseeability
standard is used too broadly. 3 13 The Task Force recommended an indepth inquiry whether the conduct has been authorized and whether
31 4
the state has deliberately adopted a policy to displace competition.
Unfortunately, the Task Force did not answer whether the authorization inquiry should be carried out by applying a strict standard as in
Bolt3"1 5 , or a broad standard as in Electrical Inspectors3 16.
Second, the Task Force recommended a clarification of the active
supervision standard. 3 17 The Task Force claimed that the current standard lacks guidance, in particular outside extreme situations as seen in
Ticor; state officials must engage in a pointed re-examination of the
private conduct, meaning that they have to develop a factual record,
309. See, e.g., Steven Semeraro, Demystifying Antitrust State Action Doctrine,34 Harv. J. L. &
Pub. Pol'y 203, 239-253 (2000) (providing an overview on current criticism).
310. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 641 (1992).
311. See OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, supra note 164, at 50.

312. See id.
313. See id. at 26.
314. See id. at 51.
315. Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 824-25 (11th Cir. 1990).
316. Elec. Inspectors, Inc. v. Viii. of East Hills, 320 F.3d 110, 119-21 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 982 (2003).
317. See OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, supra note 164, at 52.
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write a decision on the merits, and assess how the private action com3 18
ports with state legislation.
Third, exemptions from supervision for quasi-governmental entities
should be clarified and rationalized. 319 In particular, supervision
320
should be required for entities participating in a market.
Such strengthening of the existing standard would probably result in
a tiered approach to determine immunity, as favored by Delacourtand
Zywicki. The level of clear articulation and supervision required
would vary with the nature of the anticompetitive conduct and the
nature of the entity engaging in the conduct. 321 The Task Force's proposals aim to implement a stricter standard, which would undoubtedly
strengthen competition. However, the Task Force's proposals hardly
address the vagueness of the existing standard, which leaves most
problems described in section 2 unresolved.
B.

Demand for Justificationand Application of a Rule of Reason

Justice Blackmun, concurring in Cantor, proposed a simpler rule to
determine immunity. He would insist on some degree of affirmative
articulation by the state of its conscientious intent to sanction the challenged scheme, and its reasons therefore. 32 2 This solution would guarantee that the state had at least considered displacement of
competition, and regulators would have to take such considerations
into account. It would also require states to develop a proper legislative history, even for regulation whose justification is plain. 32 3 However, it was also pointed out that the intent of state legislators or
Congress may be unclear, at best, keeping in mind that the legislature
324
seldom speaks with one voice.
Inquiries with regard to the reasons behind state regulation would
result in the application of a rule of reason for anticompetitive regulatory schemes; courts would have to determine a scheme's potential
harms outweigh its benefits. The protection of health and safety, e.g.,
would in most cases be justifiable. However, in Boulder, dissenting
Justice Rehnquist pointed out that it may be difficult for the municipality to prove that the regulation benefits the community in terms of
318. See id. at 53-55. See also William J. Martin, supra note 224, at 1087-88 (arguing that the
courts shed little light on how to apply the active supervision requirement in more difficult
cases).
319. See OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, supra note 164, at 55.

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

See Id. at 55-57.
See John T. Delacourt & Todd J. Zywicki, supra note 240, at 1089-90.
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 610 (1976).
Id.
See Jim Rossi, supra note 10, at 562.
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traditional health, safety, and public welfare concerns, which outweighs the regulation's anticompetitive effects. 32 5 By asking to apply
a rule of reason in Cantor, Justice Blackmun implicitly rejected the
application of per se rules to state regulation. The rejection of per se
rules takes into account that states and municipalities may have a legitimate interest in regulating intrastate or local commerce, if necessary even by regulating prices.
It is obvious that the proposed solution goes beyond what is required under the foreseeability threshold of the clear articulation requirement, as it is applied today. Although it seems reasonable to
require some positive articulation of a state's intent to displace competition, such articulation will require a new court rule which would
determine how much articulation is sufficient to secure immunity; the
statement of only one representative will probably not be sufficient.
Blackmun's solution in Cantor would strengthen the clear articulation
requirement and implement a rule of reason to judge state regulation.
With regard to clear articulation, other countries have found ways
to implement articulation-requirements in their legislative schemes.
The Swiss constitution, for example, requires that all regulation displacing competition has to be covered by a constitutional authorization. 326 Another example is the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms of 1982. According to the Charter, the federal parliament
or a state legislature may give effect to legislative acts notwithstanding
certain individual rights incorporated in the charter; such declaration
"notwithstanding" has to be made expressly in the legislative act. 327
At first glance, the requirement to expressly declare intent to displace
competition seems an easy solution to resolve the courts' unease in
investigating the motivation of legislatures. 328 Still, the courts would
have to articulate standards for states how to express their intent to
displace competition.
Further, Blackmun's solution would require the courts to inquire
whether justifications of the anticompetitive scheme brought forward
by the state are sufficient. This requires some balancing between effects which are very difficult to determine. Courts would have to find
ways to deal with pretextual or unconvincing justifications. 329 In some
325. Cmty. Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 66 (1982).
326. Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation [Bundesverfassung], SR 101, art. 94(4)
(2006)).
327. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, art. 33 (1982).
328. See supra Part III(E).
329. See Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 363 F.3d 149 (arguing by way of example that the
connection between allowing price-fixing by car-washes and improvement of the state capital
city's symphony orchestra may be implausible).
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instances, it would mean substituting the courts' social and economic
beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies. 330 Justice Blackmun remains silent with regard to the question of what sort of justifications
he would consider sufficient; his opinion rather hints at the traditional
public interest justifications of health and safety. 33 1 Only few circuit
courts have carried out inquiries whether a regulation is supported by
legitimate state policies, such as the Second Circuit in Freedom Hold332
ings, Inc. v. Spitzer.
Some Scholars would like the courts to address considerations of
efficiency, capture of regulators, or undue wealth transfers when determining whether to grant state action immunity.3 33 Such investigations are delicate and require a deep analysis. It may be easier to
draw a line ex ante between permissible and non-permissible regulation; e.g., health and safety regulation on the one hand, and price and
entry controls on the other. 334 A similar distinction is made, e.g., by
the Swiss Supreme Court to determine permissible and impermissible
state regulation. 335 However, to have a justification of the regulatory
regime does not solve issues of supervision, which may be needed,
336
e.g., to put a check on private power.
There may be also a need for some safeguards to prevent courts
from acting as superlegislatures (which they would refuse to do).
Such safeguards may be provided by having the FTC attack state
337
regulation.
We have to also keep in mind that such inquiry into the reasonableness of regulation would constitute a departure from the traditional
State Action Doctrine, which requires states to meet certain procedural requirements (clearly stated policy, active supervision) only. For
the time being, states do not have to meet substantive requirements.
Only such substantive requirements - e.g. justification of regulation
330. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
331. See also Steven Semeraro, supra note 310, at 212 (requiring judges to decide whether a
government actor's conception of the public interest is being furthered by the anticompetitive
restraint).
332. 357 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004). See also infra note 330.
333. See John S. Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 73988 (1986); John Cirace, An Economic Analysis of the 'State-MunicipalAction' Antitrust Cases, 61
TEX. L. REV. 481, 490-96 (1982).
334. See Paul S. Posner, supra note 8, at 707-14. Posner further argues that adequate consideration must be given by legislators to issues normally addressed by competition, such as consumer
welfare. Id. at 717.
335. See, e.g., J. v. Department of Health of the State of Zurich, BGE 125 I 335, 337 (1999).
336. See Paul S. Posner, supra note 8, at 720-26.
337. See infra Part IV(D)(2).
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by concerns for health, safety, and public welfare - would limit the
possible impact of their regulation on competition.
C.

Market ParticipantException

By introducing a market participant exception into the State Action
Doctrine, Parker Immunity would be inapplicable or more difficult to
obtain in cases where the State or'a municipality is acting as an ordinary participant in the market. In Omni, Justice Scalia argued that the
Parker"immunity does not necessarily obtain where the State acts not
in a regulatory capacity but as a commercial participant in a given
market. '33 8 He further argued "that, with the possible market participant exception, any action that qualifies as state action is 'ipso
facto'. . . exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws'. ' 339 The
Report of the State Action Task Force identified some Circuit Court
decisions favorably inclined towards a market participant exception. 340 However, some circuits see no meaningful distinction between governmental and proprietary activities of the state. 34 1 A
market participant exception will make it more difficult for state actors to obtain immunity. There is no reason to treat states differently
from private actors if a state is becoming a participant in a private
342
agreement or in a combination with others to restrain trade.
There were some hopes that the court would also scrutinize anticompetitive abuses of regulatory power, which are only carried out
to favor a state-owned or otherwise affiliated enterprise. In California
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,343 the Supreme Court
stated that "[c]onspiracy with a licensing authority to eliminate a competitor" or "bribery of a public purchasing agent" may constitute a
violation of the antitrust laws. In Allied Tube Conduit Corp. v. Indian
Head, Inc.,344 the Supreme Court stated that "one could imagine situations where the most effective means of influencing government officials is bribery, and we have never suggested that that kind of attempt
338. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1991).
339. Id. at 379.
340. See OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, supra note 164, at 47-48 (citing Genentech, Inc. v. Eli
Lilly.and Co., 98 F.2d 931, 948 (Fed. Cir. 1993); A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc.,
263 F.3d 239, 265 n.55 (3d Cir. 2001); Hedgecock v. Blackwell Land Co., No. 93-166604, 1995
WL 161649, at 2 (9th Cir., April 7, 1995)).
341. See, e.g., McCallum v. City of Athens, Ga., 976 F.2d 649, 653 n.7 (11th Cir. 1992); Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 402 n.9 (9th Cir. 1991).
342. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1943). See also OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING,
supra note 164, at 57 (recommending application of the supervision requirement for municipal
enterprises).

343. 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972) (in the context of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine).
344. 486 U.S. 492, 504 (1988) (in the context of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine).
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to influence the government merits protection." One could argue
with good reasons that such an exception should also apply to Parker
immunity.
The Omni Court, however, rejected introducing a conspiracy exception into Parker immunity: "These sentences should not be read to
suggest the general proposition that even governmental regulatory action may be deemed private - and therefore subject to antitrust liabil'345
ity - when it is taken pursuant to a conspiracy with private parties.
Therefore, abuses of a state's regulatory power cannot be attacked.
Still, such abuses are not motivated by public interest, but rather
aimed at shoveling advantages to the state-owned or associated enterprises, either by establishing a monopoly or imposing other restraints
on competitors. The participation of a state or a municipality in a
market as a competitor of private actors creates a conflict of interest
with its capacity as regulator. This conflict of interest calls for higher
scrutiny, which was denied by the Supreme Court's rejection of a conspiracy exception. If we focus on prevention of damage to the competitive process, the rejection of a conspiracy exception seems
misguided.
In summary, we may welcome the introduction of a market participant exemption to Parker. There is no reason why a state-owned enterprise should be treated differently from private competitors, absent
further regulatory restraints. 346 However, the Supreme Court's refusal of a conspiracy exception to Parker opens a door for abuses of
the state's regulatory power to favor state-owned or otherwise affiliated enterprises.
D.

FTC Enforcement

The FTC already makes use of a competition advocacy program to
combat inefficient regulation. The program is designed to persuade
governmental actors at all levels of the political system to further competition and consumer choice. Advocacy is not an instrument of enforcement, and it is used when antitrust immunity is likely to provide a
shield from FTC Actions. 34 7 Particularly because of the extended
345. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1991).
346. After several abuses of market power by state-owned enterprises (all held immune
against antitrust scrutiny by the Swiss Supreme Court), the Swiss legislature amended Article 2
of the Swiss Cartel Act to grant equal protection for antitrust violations of state-owned and
private enterprises. Anyone offering or requesting goods in the economic process, independent
of its form of organization, is subject to antitrust liability. The law may provide exceptions to
this general rule.
347. See James C. Cooper et al., Theory and Practice of Competition Advocacy at the FTC, 72
ANTITRUST L. J. 1091, 1091 (2005).
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reach of the FTC Act 348 (1), the FTC would also be well-suited to
spearhead challenges to anticompetitive regulation in enforcement
proceedings (2).
1. The Reach of Section Five of the FTC Act
The FTC is given authority to enforce the substance of all antitrust
laws. 349 In particular, Section 5 of the FTC Act grants the FTC authority to challenge "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce. ' 350 Section 5 of the FTC Act includes all unlawful practices under the Sherman Act, which encompasses state action not
meeting the Midcal standard. Further, there are some hints that the
351
reach of Section 5 could be even broader.
In F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,352 the Supreme Court addressed the question whether Section 5 of the FTC Act is limited to
conduct which violates the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws. After a
careful analysis of the act's legislative history and precedent, the
Court ruled that the "Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate
excessive power to itself if, in measuring a practice against the elusive,
but congressionally mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court of
equity, considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in the
letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws. '353 Thus, the
powers of the FTC reach beyond the established grounds of the Sherman Act.
The reach of Section 5 of the FTC Act was more precisely defined
in FTC. v. Indiana Federationof Dentists354 : "[t]he standard of 'unfairness' under the FTC Act is, by necessity, an elusive one, encompassing
not only practices that violate the Sherman Act and the other antitrust
laws. . . . but also practices that the Commission determines are

against public policy for other reasons. ' 355 We find a similar holding
already in Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC,356 where the Supreme Court
held that "all that is necessary in § 5 proceedings to find a violation is
348. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
349. See Herbert Hovenkamp, supra note 274, at 596 (the FI'C has direct authority to with
respect to the Clayton Act and the Robinson Patman Act; § 5 of the FTC Act has been interpreted to include all practices under the Sherman Act).
350. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
351. See ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 74 (2003).

352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

405 U.S. 233 (1972).
Id. at 244.
476 U.S. 447 (1986).
Id. at 454.
381 U.S. 357 (1965).
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to discover conduct that 'runs counter to the public policy declared in
'357
the' Act.
FTC v. Brown Shoe358 confirmed that Section 5 of the FTC Act
goes beyond the reach of the other federal antitrust laws. The Supreme Court held "that the Commission has power under § 5 to arrest
trade restraints in their incipiency without proof that they amount to
an outright violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act or other provisions of
359
the antitrust laws."
The scope of conduct which can be reached by the FTC in its incipiency is rather unclear, however. In E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
FTC,360 the Second Circuit acknowledged that the FTC may bar incipient violations of the federal antitrust statutes; 361 however, the court
was not willing to reach facilitating practices for an oligopoly without
seeing some evidence of agreement, anticompetitive intent, or absence of an independent legitimate business reason. 362 In Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC,3 6 3 the Second Circuit refused to accept the
FTC's strict interpretation of the Colgate Doctrine 364 .
In summary, enforcement by the FTC has some more bite than enforcement by the Antitrust Division, private parties, or the States' Attorneys Generals. The courts generally acknowledge that the FTC
may challenge anticompetitive acts in their incipiency, and acts that
run counter the public policy declared in the antitrust laws. However,
both of these grounds lack clear definition. We can not predict today
whether the FTC would be given more authority to challenge state
action.
357. Id. at 369.
358. 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
359. Id. at 322.
360. 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
361. Id. at 136.
362. Id. at 139. See also Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 581 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that "we are unable to sustain an approach that finds a non-collusive pricing method to be
illegal despite the absence of some reliable indicator that the practice had an effect on overall
price levels.").
363. 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983).
364. United States v. Colgate & Co, 250 U.S. 300 (1919). In Colgate, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the Sherman Act does not apply to suppliers' unilateral refusals to deal with distributors that do not charge the resale prices "suggested" by the suppliers. In long-lasting supplierdistributor relationships, the Colgate decision grants the supplier substantial influence over resale prices as long as the supplier avoids entering into agreements to this effect. In Russell Stover
Candies,the FTC unsuccessfully challenged Colgate on the ground that it was tantamount to perse illegal minimum resale price maintenance. Subsequently, Colgate was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Co., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
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Advantages of FTC-Enforcement

There are several reasons why challenges of State Action under
Section 5 of the FTC Act are more promising than the other possibilities of enforcement. FTC-enforcement addresses many concerns,
which I have expressed under section III of this essay. In particular,
FTC-enforcement mitigates issues with federalism, the vagueness of
the standard, the unfairness of the application of antirust laws, the
threat of treble damages, and the refusal of courts to inquire into the
reasonableness of state regulation.
The courts acknowledge FTC's power to challenge acts against the
public policy expressed in the federal antitrust laws. Any state regulation displacing competition can be regarded as an infringement of the
(federal) public policy of unfettered competition. The FTC, as an independent regulatory agency, is best suited to defend the federal policy interest. There is no way to avoid the clash of public policies, i.e.
the state's interest to regulate its commerce and the federal interest in
competition. Still, it may be more acceptable for the courts if an independent federal agency attacks state regulation, compared to challenges brought by regulated parties, competitors, or consumers.
Federalism is a concept that divides sovereignty between a federation and its states; regulated parties, competitors, and consumers pursue only their private interests and may be biased when dealing with
issues of federalism. Shifting the weight of enforcement to the FTC in
state action cases does not abrogate federal jurisdiction in parallel
cases based on Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. These cases may
still be brought by (biased) consumers or competitors. Compared to
FTC enforcement, however, the federal courts may be expected to
deny consumers and competitors the same leeway in challenging state
regulation, in particular because of the different origin and legal basis
of such claims.
In the European Community, the European Commission may bring
actions to challenge the member state's failure to comply with provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community. Particularly this is important with regard to infringements of the provisions
securing the internal market in articles 28-30 of the Treaty. Enforcement by the Commission also provides an unbiased enforcement instrument. 365 The Swiss federal law on the internal market
incorporates a more innovative solution: it allows the Competition

365. Art. 226 and 230(2) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.
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Commission to appeal all administrative decisions of the states, which
366
affect access of private parties to regulated markets.
The lack of guidance provided by the State Action Doctrine is one
of the major problems for state actors, regulated parties, or competitors when regulation is attacked. Courts never deal with state regulation in the abstract. Instead, they address the problems of state action
in specific cases, each of which is surrounded by special factual circumstances and by its own history. Judges may be overwhelmed by
the task of having to apply a vague standard on state regulation to
concrete facts, since the Supreme Court precedents also deal with
cases surrounded by unique circumstances.
We may argue with good reasons that the FTC may be more able to
provide clear guidance with regard to the interpretation of the doctrine. Approximately one hundred-eighty attorneys in the FTC Bureau of Competition support five Trade Commissioners, 367 providing a
lot of expert knowledge to deal with the effects of state action. Instead of seeking to clarify the vague standard in courts, the FTC could
draft guidelines clarifying the existing standard 368 and file enforcement actions accordingly. This would require some willingness on the
part of the courts to pay deference to these FTC-Guidelines on state
action.
Since the Lochner era, courts have been very reluctant to substitute
their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, or to sit as a superlegislature. The FTC, however, may provide the
expert knowledge to assess the anticompetitive effects of state regulation in the markets. It may also provide a thorough analysis with regard to the importance of the state's interest in sustaining the
regulation, compared to the federal interest in abolishing it. As I have
described, the FTC is probably less biased in carrying out this analysis,
since it is not immediately affected by the state action. It may be easier for courts to overcome their reluctance to (indirectly) abrogate
state regulation in an enforcement action of the FTC because of two
further reasons. First, the courts are generally obliged to accept the
factual findings of the FTC, if supported by evidence. 369 Second, the
366. Swiss Law on the Internal Market [Binnenmarktgesetz], SR 943.02, art. 9(2) (2006). The
approach is innovative because the burden to seek market access in the first place is still laid on
the affected private parties.
367. See Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Competition, What is the FTCs Bureau of
Competition?, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/recruit/what-is.html.
368. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a).
369. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c).
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courts generally give great weight to the FTC's interpretation if the
law.

37 0

Enforcement actions by the FTC also address concerns regarding
the fairness of applying antitrust laws and imposing treble damages
upon regulated parties. Most likely, the remedy in case of state action
would consist in an order to cease and desist. 37 1 Regulated parties do
not have to fear civil penalties, except if they violate a previous cease
and desist order of the Commission. 372 State action in violation of
Section 5 of the FTC Act, which may be outside the scope of the Sherman Act, will not support subsequent private actions for treble damages. 373 In particular, no violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act will
serve as prima facie evidence in subsequent trials. 374 Therefore, cease
and desist orders of the FTC would not discourage regulation of interstate commerce by states or municipalities. Cease and desist orders do
not expose regulated parties to treble damages, which could discourage their participation in drafting regulation.
In summary, challenges of state action by FTC enforcement actions
overcome most problems described in section 2 of this essay. Such
challenges should be pursued as one of the promising alternatives to
addressing anticompetitive state action.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Parker and Midcal tests, as applied today, provide very little
guidance for regulators, regulated parties, and possible competitors.
In fact, the existing standard used to determine immunity from antitrust laws is not applied in a consistent, uniform way. This lack of
guidance results in strong concerns regarding the vague standard's impact on fairness of justice. It is not easy to justify why a regulated
party, possibly compelled to engage in anticompetitive behavior by
regulation, should be liable to treble damages. Moreover, the uncertainty of the standard may induce regulators to refrain from legitimate
regulation, or to make use of inefficient or ineffective instruments to
regulate private market participants.
These concerns will not be resolved by mere refinement of the existing standard, but only by an implementation of a combination of
measures. Such a combination of measures would require courts to
370. See Herbert Hovenkamp, supra note 274, at 597.
371. We may think of state action which requires private actors to merge; in such a case, e.g.,
an order of the FTC would result in dissolution or divestiture, and not in cease or desist.
372. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m).
373. See Herbert Hovenkamp, supra note 274, at 597.
374. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a).
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resume inquiries into the reasons behind state regulation, and would
require courts to assess whether the benefits of regulation, enacted in
pursuance of legitimate state policy, outweigh its anticompetitive effects. Since courts will be reluctant to initiate such inquiries, the FTC
as federal agency, unbiased to private interests, should carry out the
necessary inquiries and defend the federal interest of unfettered competition. Enforcement actions by the FTC have further advantages in
the context of state regulation, such as the broader range of Section 5
FTC Act, the predominant use of cease and desist orders as a remedy,
and the reduced threat of treble damages. Courts would be required
to extend today's deference to FTC-decisions; they would also have to
be more ready to accept the FTC's findings regarding state regulation.

